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WESTCOURT CORPORATION SDN BHD LWN. TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PEMBELI
RUMAH
MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN,
PUTRAJAYA
[RAYUAN SIVIL
NO: 01-11-2004 (W)]
AHMAD FAIRUZ KHN
, PAJAN SINGH GILL HMP , AUGUSTINE PAUL HMR
6 SEPTEMBER 2004
PENGHAKIMAN
Ahmad Fairuz KHN:
Pada 14 Jun 2004, mahkamah
ini telah mendengar rayuan perayu di atas soalan berikut:
whether the Tribunal
has jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate on cases where the sale and purchase
agreement was entered into before 1 December 2002 and, if so to what extent.
Di akhir pendengaran rayuan,
mahkamah ini telah menolak rayuan perayu dan berikut adalah alasan-alasan
bagi keputusan tersebut.
Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli
Rumah (selepas ini disebut tribunal) telah ditubuhkan melalui Akta Pemaju
Perumahan (Kawalan dan Pelesenan) (Pindaan) 2002 (Akta Pindaan) yang berkuatkuasa
pada 1 Disember 2002. Tujuan penubuhan ini adalah untuk membolehkan tribunal
mendengar tuntutan oleh pembeli rumah terhadap pemaju perumahan. Sebelum
Akta Pindaan ini berkuatkuasa, seseorang pembeli rumah boleh menuntut gantirugi
terhadap pemaju perumahan melalui tindakan di Mahkamah Sivil.
Pada 27 Mac 2003, tribunal
di dalam Tuntutan No. TTPR/B/0057/03 telah membuat penghakiman bahawa perayu
dikehendaki membayar kepada Tan Geok Moi sebanyak RM13,926.74. Pada 5 Mei
2003 Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telah memberi kebenaran kepada perayu
untuk memulakan prosiding semakan kehakiman (judicial review) untuk suatu
perintah certiorari bagi membatalkan penghakiman itu dan untuk suatu
pengisytiharan bahawa tribunal tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar
tuntutan di mana perjanjian jualbeli dimasuki sebelum 1 Disember 2002. Pada
4 September 2003 Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan bahawa tribunal tidak mempunyai
bidang kuasa untuk mendengar tuntutan-tuntutan itu dan memberikan perintah-perintah
seperti yang dipohon. Jika Parlimen, mengikut mahkamah itu, berhasrat memberikan
tribunal bidang kuasa kebelakangan untuk meliputi perjanjian jualbeli yang
dimasuki sebelum berkuatkuasanya Akta Pindaan tersebut, maka Parlimen akan
mengatakan sedemikian dengan perkataan-perkataan yang jelas sepertimana
dinyatakan di dalam s. 32(2) Akta Pindaan yang berbunyi " Every agreement,
assignment or charge lawfully entered into between a purchaser and his financier
before the appointed date shall be subject to, and the parties thereto shall
be entitled to the benefits of, the new s. 22C of the principal Act " .
YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi selanjutnya menekankan bahawa di bawah s. 16AD
hanya ketidakpatuhan kepada sesuatu award tribunal dan bukannya kemungkiran
syarat perjanjian itu sendiri yang akan membawa kepada liabiliti jenayah.
Sungguhpun demikian award tersebut adalah, mengikut YA, berlanjutan daripada
kemungkiran perjanjian jualbeli. Oleh kerana kemungkiran-kemungkiran dalam
permohonan-permohonan di hadapannya berlaku sebelum penubuhan tribunal,
dan oleh kerana Parlimen tidak memperuntukkan dengan nyata bahawa pindaan-pindaan
itu mempunyai kesan kebelakangan, maka YA berpendapat bahawa tribunal tidak
mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar tuntutan-tuntutan yang terbit daripada
perjanjian jualbeli yang dimasuki sebelum 1 Disember 2002.
Terhadap keputusan Mahkamah
Tinggi itu, tribunal merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan. YA Richard Malanjum
HMR di dalam penghakimannya berkata:
Applying the liberal
and purposive approach to the statutory provisions that deal with the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal we find that the argument advanced for the
Respondents is premised on at least two assumptions. Firstly, that the
date in a sale and purchase agreement is material in determining the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal. Secondly, any award given for a breach of a sale and
purchase agreement entered into prior to the appointed date, particularly
where the breach was before that date, would tantamount to allowing criminal
law to operate retrospectively since it is now punishable being an offence
for any failure to comply with or satisfy such award. This argument of
course relates to the legal principle that criminal law cannot be made
to operate retrospectively unless specifically stipulated.
With respect, we find
the first assumption to be without basis. There is nothing in the provisions
establishing the Tribunal or related thereto which can be said to support
it. In our view while section 16M sets out the general jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, it is section 16N and in particular subsection 16N(2) thereof
that provides the perimeter of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
Mengenai s. 16N(2) itu,
YA Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan juga berkata:
Sub-section 16N(2) does
not stipulate a cut off point by reference to date of agreement vis-a-vis
jurisdiction. All that is required of the Tribunal in assuming jurisdiction
to hear a claim presented before it is to verify whether it is within
the ambit of subsection 16N(2) that is to say:
(a) whether the claim
is based 'on a cause of action arising from the sale and purchase agreement
entered into between the homebuyer and the licensed housing developer;
and
(b) whether the claim
is 'brought by a homebuyer not later than twelve months from the date
of issuance of the certificate of fitness for occupation for the housing
accommodation or the expiry date of the defects liability period as
set out in the sale and purchase agreement.'
We do not think there
should be any additional or prerequisite term to be read into the provisions.
To do so would tantamount to adding what is not in the statute. And that
should not be done since Judges are not legislators.
YA HMR itu seterusnya
berkata:
In fact the need for
a sale and purchase agreement as a condition precedent in filing a claim
has also been waived by subsection 16N(3) ...
Mengenai s. 16AD, YA Hakim
Mahkamah Rayuan itu memutuskan:
We are conscious of
the counter-argument that without a breach in the first place there is
no question of an award being given by the Tribunal and without an award
there is no issue of penalty arising. And if a breach occurred before
the appointed date that would effectively be criminalizing an act retrospectively.
With respect, a distinction
should be drawn between a breach of the sale and purchase agreement and
an award rendered arising from such breach. As we have stated earlier
on it is not the breach of the sale and purchase agreement that has been
criminalized. Rather it is the failure to comply with or satisfy any award
given by the Tribunal in connection with any claim made pursuant to such
breach. At any rate section 16AD does not empower the Tribunal to impose
any penalty. It only provides for a defaulter to be subject to prosecution
which invariably is the task of another authority in a separate criminal
proceeding. And on being prosecuted a defaulter is at liberty to raise
in defence the inapplicability of the section to him. Such approach was
successful in the case of Energoprojek (M) Holdings v. Public Prosecutor
[1998] 5 MLJ 401. Accordingly, we do not think section 16AD is intended
to take away any substantive right of any person. Neither is it meant
to affect or limit the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in any manner howsoever.
Berkenaan hujah perayu
bahawa jika tribunal dibenarkan mendengar tuntutan yang berasaskan perjanjian
jualbeli yang dimasuki sebelum tarikh 1 Disember 2002, ia akan menjejas
dan memprejudis hak-hak substantif responden, YA HMR itu berkata:
It is to be noted that
the establishment of the Tribunal is in effect a creation of another forum
intended for speedy disposal at a minimum cost of a prescribed claim up
to the limit of RM25,000.00 by a homebuyer against a licensed housing
developer for breach of a sale and purchase agreement entered into between
the parties. There is therefore no question of the rights of anyone being
eroded or removed as was envisaged in The Colonial Sugar Refining Company,
Limited v. Irving [1905] AC 369 (PC). (See also: Lim Phin Khian
v. Kho Su Ming [1996] 1 MLJ 1).
And although it may
be argued that the imposition of penalty has a prejudicial effect, such
preposition may be true if it is the breach of the sale and purchase agreement
that has been criminalized. But here it is not the case.
Lantas, rayuan perayu
ditolak oleh Mahkamah Rayuan.
Di mahkamah ini, Encik
Lambert Rasa-Ratnam bagi pihak perayu telah juga berhujah bahawa tribunal
tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar tuntutan berkaitan perjanjian
jualbeli yang dimasuki sebelum 1 Disember 2002. Untuk menyokong hujahnya,
Encik Lambert Rasa-Ratnam merujuk kepada ungkapan penghakiman mahkamah ini
di dalam kes Lim Phin Khian v. Kho Su Ming [1996] 1 CLJ 529 yang
berbunyi:
The presumption against
retrospectivity of legislation is based upon the judicial philosophy that
Parliament does not intend an unjust result. See Pesuruhjaya Ibu Kota
Kuala Lumpur v. Public Trustee & Ors [1971] 2 MLJ 30 at 31. That this
approach is still current appears from two recent decisions of the House
of Lords. The first of these is 'The Boucraa' [1994] 1 All ER 20
at pp 29-30 where Lord Mustill said:
My Lords, it would be
impossible now to doubt that the court is required to approach questions
of statutory interpretation with a disposition, and in some cases a very
strong disposition, to assume that a statute is not intended to have retrospective
effect. Nor indeed would I wish to cast any doubt on the validity of this
approach for it ensures that the courts are constantly on the alert for
the kind of unfairness which is found in, for example, the characterization
of past conduct which was lawful when it took place, or on alterations
to the antecedent natural, civil or familiar status ...
Encik Lambert Rasa-Ratnam
juga merujuk kepada kes Sim Seoh Beng @ Sim Sai Beng & Anor v. Koperasi
Tunas Muda Sungai Ara Bhd [1995] 1 CLJ 491 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan berkata:
In our judgment, the
correct test to be applied to determine whether a written law is prospective
or retrospective is to first ascertain whether it would affect substantive
rights if applied retrospectively. If it would, then, prima facie
that law must be construed as having prospective effect only, unless there
is a clear indication in the enactment that it is in any event to have
retrospectivity.
Encik Lambert Rasa-Ratnam
menegaskan bahawa pindaan itu bukan hanya berkaitan dengan forum tetapi
melibatkan juga hak-hak substantif perayu di mana dengan kemasukan s. 16AD,
obligasi perayu di sisi undang-undang telah berubah sifat. Ini kerana s.
16AD mengenakan penalti jenayah bagi ketidakpatuhan kepada award yang dibuat
oleh tribunal dan penalti itu tidak dikenakan terhadap perayu sebelum Akta
Pindaan itu berkuatkuasa. Encik Lambert Rasa-Ratnam merujuk kepada Craies
on Statute Law (6th edn) di mana di ms 386 penulis mentakrifkan undang-undang
kebelakangan seperti berikut:
which takes away or
impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws or creates a new
obligation, or imposes a new duty; or attaches a new disability in respect
to transactions or considerations already past.
Encik Lambert Rasa-Ratnam
berhujah bahawa pihak-pihak, ketika memasuki perjanjian jualbeli, tidak
menjangkakan kemungkiran perjanjian itu akan mengakibatkan kesalahan jenayah.
Jika tribunal diberi bidang kuasa ke atas perjanjian sebelum 1 Disember
2002, ini bermakna undang-undang jenayah akan berkuatkuasa kebelakangan
sedangkan ini di larang oleh Perkara 7 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Justeru
itu Encik Lambert Rasa-Ratnam berhujah bahawa jika mahkamah ini memutuskan
bahawa tribunal mempunyai bidang kuasa ke atas perjanjian jualbeli yang
dimasuki sebelum 1 Disember 2002, beliau menggesa mahkamah menghadkan pemakaian
s. 16AD hanya kepada perjanjian yang dimasuki selepas tarikh tersebut.
Di dalam hujahan balasnya,
Peguam Negara bagi pihak responden merujuk kepada kes Energoprojek (M)
Holdings v. PP supra, dan menekankan bahawa mahkamah perlu melihat kepada
tujuan sesuatu perundangan digubal. Tujuan Parlimen menggubal Akta Pemaju
Perumahan (Kawalan dan Pelesenan) 1966 ialah untuk melindungi pembeli-pembeli
rumah daripada pemaju perumahan. Seksyen 16AD, hujah Peguam Negara, tidak
boleh ditafsir sebagai mewujudkan suatu kesalahan bagi kemungkiran perjanjian
kerana di bawah seksyen itu yang menjadi kesalahan adalah ketidakpatuhan
kepada award tribunal. Kedua-dua perkara itu, mengikut Peguam Negara adalah
tidak berhubungkait. Oleh kerana yang menjadi kesalahan jenayah ialah ketidakpatuhan
kepada award dan award itu hanya diberi selepas 1 Disember 2002. Seksyen
16AD, tegas Peguam Negara, adalah berkuatkuasa secara prospektif dan oleh
demikian tidaklah bercanggah dengan Perkara 7 Perlembagaan Persekutuan.
Persoalan di hadapan mahkamah
ini ialah sama ada tribunal mempunyai bidang kuasa mendengar tuntutan yang
timbul daripada perjanjian jualbeli yang dimasuki sebelum tarikh Akta Pindaan
berkuatkuasa. Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan Mahkamah Rayuan bahawa bidang
kuasa tribunal adalah sebagaimana diperuntukkan oleh s. 16N(2) yang berbunyi:
The jurisdiction of
the Tribunal shall be limited to a claim that is based on a cause of action
arising from the sale and purchase agreement entered into between the
homebuyer and the licensed housing developer which is brought by a homebuyer
not later than twelve months from the date of issuance of the certificate
of fitness for occupation for the housing accommodation or the expiry
date of the defects liability period as set out in the sale and purchase
agreement.
Sehubungan ini, mahkamah
ini merujuk kepada s. 16N(3) dan s. 16O(1) Akta Pindaan yang masing-masingnya
memperuntukkan bahawa:
16N (1) ...
(2) ...
(3) Notwithstanding
subsection (2) no claim shall be affected or defeated on the ground that
no sale and purchase agreement has been entered into between the homebuyer
and the licensed housing developer at the time when the cause of action
accrues if there exists a previous dealing between the homebuyer and the
licensed housing developer in respect of the acquisition of the housing
accommodation.
160 (1) Notwithstanding
that the amount or value of the subject-matter claimed or in issue exceeds
twenty-five thousand ringgit, the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to
hear and determine the claim if the parties have entered into an agreement
in writing that the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine
the claim.
Peruntukan-peruntukan
di atas menunjukkan bahawa bidang kuasa tribunal ditetapkan secara longgar.
Ini pada pendapat mahkamah, menunjukkan hasrat Parlimen untuk menyediakan
suatu forum yang mudah bagi pembeli-pembeli rumah membuat tuntutan. Mahkamah
ini bersetuju dengan Mahkamah Rayuan bahawa:
It is absurd in our
view to say that Parliament proceeded to legislate for the establishment
of the Tribunal well aware that it would only begin to serve its purpose
a few years later since it would be inconceivable for claims to arise
on breaches of sale and purchase agreements entered into prior to the
appointed date. Meanwhile the claims of homebuyers based on breaches of
sale and purchase agreements entered into prior to the appointed date
would continue to languish under the present set up. Surely that must
have been the very mischief which Parliament intended to address when
it legislated for the establishment of the Tribunal.
Di dalam kes Chebaro
v. Chebaro [1986] 2 All ER 897 pihak-pihak telah berkahwin di Beirut,
Lebanon dan menetap di United Kingdom. Mereka kemudian berpisah tetapi masih
tinggal di England. Pada 16 April 1985, atas permohonan suami, dikri cerai
telah diberikan di Lebanon. Selepas s. 12 " Matrimonial and Family Proceedings
Act 1984 " berkuatkuasa di England pada 16 September 1985, isteri telah
memohon kebenaran untuk suatu perintah untuk relif kewangan. Seksyen 12
Akta itu berbunyi:
Where - (a) a marriage
has been dissolved or annulled, or the parties to a marriage have been
legally separated, by means of judicial or other proceedings in an overseas
country, and (b) the divorce, annulment or legal separation is entitled
to be recognized as valid in England and Wales, either party to the marriage
may apply to the court in the manner prescribed by rules of court for
an order for financial relief under this Part of this Act.
Sheldon J membenarkan
permohonan isteri dan di dalam penghakimannya di ms 903 berkata:
Apart from his reliance
in the present case on the general proposition that legislation is not
to be regarded as having retrospective operation unless such a construction
is unavoidable, counsel for the husband has pointed to the unfair consequences
to the husband that might follow in such an event; the creation of new
rights and obligations and by the imposition on him of potentially severe
financial liability which did not exist when his marriage was dissolved.
The possibility of such disadvantages, of course, I accept; indeed, the
risk that such consequences will follow forms the basis of the court's
dislike of retrospective legislation. That is not to say, however, that
such risks are not contemplated or even intended by Parliament when introducing
new legislation.
Di ms 904 YA berkata:
In my judgment ... those
words, in their ordinary and natural meaning, apply initially to all cases
in which the divorce, annulment or legal separation has been pronounced
in judicial or other proceedings overseas, whatever the date of such proceedings
and even if it was before 16 September 1985, and accordingly, the provisions
in question are retrospective in their effect.
Terhadap keputusan YA
Hakim itu, suami merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan dan Balcombe LJ di dalam
Chebaro v. Chebaro [1987] Fam 127 berkata di ms 131:
... in my judgment the
meaning of the words used is plain and unequivocal. The use of the past
tense - " Where ... a marriage has been dissolved " - in contradistinction
to the present tense in the following paragraph - and ... the divorce
... is entitled to be recognized " - makes it clear that the section is
intended to apply to a decree of divorce, whenever pronounced and whether
before or after 16 September 1985 ... Further support for this construction
is afforded by the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 15(1)
of the Act of 1984. These lay down the jurisdictional requirements which
have to be satisfied for the court to entertain an application for financial
relief under Part III. They are if:
(a) either of the
parties to the marriage was domiciled in England and Wales ... on the
date on which the divorce, annulment or legal separation obtained in
overseas country took effect in that country; or (b) either of the parties
was habitually resident in England and Wales throughout the period of
one year ending with the date ... on which the divorce, annulment or
legal separation obtained in the overseas country took effect in that
country; ...
This is language which
it is hard to reconcile with a construction that limits the operation
of section 12 only to those overseas divorces granted after the date when
Part III came into force.
Neill LJ pula berkata
di ms 134:
In my judgment the intention
of the legislature can be determined with sufficient certainty by looking
at the words of section 12(1) of the Act of 1984 by themselves. It is
plain from the concluding words of the subsection that a person can apply
to the court for financial relief if the conditions set out in paragraphs
(a) and (b) are satisfied. It is also to be observed that this right can
be exercised by either party to the marriage.
Jelas daripada ungkapan-ungkapan
penghakiman di atas, mahkamah itu mengambil pendekatan bahawa mengikut maksud
dan kesan biasa s. 12 itu, soal sama ada sesuatu perkahwinan itu dibubarkan
sebelum atau selepas seksyen itu berkuatkuasa tidak penting. Apa yang penting
ialah syarat-syarat yang dinyatakan di dalam seksyen itu dipenuhi.
Prinsip yang sama juga
dipakai di dalam kes Hager v. Osborne [1992] Fam 94. Di dalam kes
itu, pemohon telah pada 5 Julai 1990 memohon, di bawah s. 11B " Guardianship
of Minors Act 1971 " yang berkuatkuasa pada 1 April 1989, peruntukan kewangan
bagi anaknya yang dilahirkan pada 23 December 1983. Responden menafikan
dirinya ayah kepada anak itu dan memohon membatalkan tuntutan pemohon atas
alasan, antara lainnya, bahawa s. 11B itu tidak berkuatkuasa kebelakangan.
Seksyen 11B itu berbunyi:
The court may, on the
application of either parent of a child, make - (a) in the case of proceedings
in the High Court or a county court, one or more of the orders mentioned
in subsection (2) of this section; ... (2) The orders referred to in subsection
(1) of this section are - (a) an order requiring one parent to make to
the other parent for the benefit of the child, or to the child, such periodical
payments, and for such term as may be specified in the order; ... (c)
an order requiring one parent to pay to the other parent for the benefit
of the child, or to the child, such lump sum as may be so specified; (d)
an order requiring either parent to transfer to the other parent for the
benefit of the child, or to the child such property as may be so specified,
being property to which the first-mentioned parent is entitled, either
in possession or reversion; (e) an order requiring that a settlement of
such a property as may be so specified, being property to which either
parent is so entitled, be made to the satisfaction of the court for the
benefit of the child.
Merujuk kepada penghujahan
peguam responden YA Hakim berkata di ms 99:
Mr. Turner ... submits,
and there is attraction to this submission, that by section 2 of the Affiliation
Proceedings Act 1957, three years having elapsed since the child's birth
without the respondent having paid money for the child's maintenance,
the respondent had acquired the right pursuant to section 2 of the Affiliation
Proceedings Act 1957 not to be sued for maintenance thereafter, and accordingly,
that accrued right should not be taken away from him retrospectively.
Seksyen 2 " Affiliation
Proceedings Act 1957 " memperuntukkan masa bagi membuat aduan mengenai "
paternity " seperti berikut:
(a) at any time within
three years from the child's birth, or, (b) at any subsequent time, upon
proof that the man alleged to be the father of the child has within the
three years next after the birth paid money for its maintenance ...
Berhubung peruntukan ini
YA Hakim berkata:
It is common ground
that the respondent made no such payment for the boy's maintenance, and
consequently the mother would not have been entitled to seek an order
for such maintenance after 23 December 1986. That date passed without
any further proceedings being launched and the respondent was thus entitled
to feel that he was no longer at risk of being required to maintain his
child.
YA Hakim bagaimanapun
menolak permohonan responden untuk membatalkan tindakan pemohon dengan menyatakan
demikian di ms 101:
In my judgment, the
natural and ordinary meaning of section 11B of the Act 1971, taken in
isolation and taken in the context of the other provisions I have referred
to, leads inevitably to the conclusion that no rule or presumption against
retrospectivity operates so as to prevent the claim being made on the
facts such as those before me.
Demikian juga dengan rayuan
di hadapan mahkamah ini. Berasaskan ungkapan-ungkapan penghakiman di atas,
mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan Mahkamah Rayuan bahawa mengikut s. 16N(2),
asalkan tuntutan di hadapan tribunal itu melibatkan perjanjian jualbeli
di antara pembeli rumah dan pemaju perumahan berlesen dan tuntutan dibuat
dalam masa tidak melebihi 12 bulan daripada tarikh pengeluaran sijil penghunian
atau tarikh luput tempoh liabiliti kecacatan seperti dinyatakan di dalam
perjanjian jualbeli, maka tribunal mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar
tuntutan tersebut tanpa mengira tarikh perjanjian. Tafsiran ini, pada pendapat
mahkamah ini, diperkuatkan oleh s. 16N(3) yang memperuntukkan bahawa sesuatu
tuntutan tidak akan dijejaskan atau digagalkan atas alasan tiada perjanjian
jualbeli wujud di antara pembeli rumah dan pemaju perumahan berlesen pada
masa kausa tindakan akru jika terdapat suatu urusan terdahulu antara pihak-pihak
itu mengenai pemerolehan penghunian rumah. Justeru pada pendapat mahkamah
ini, tarikh perjanjian bukanlah perkara yang material bagi membolehkan tribunal
mendengar tuntutan pembeli rumah itu.
Dari suatu sudut yang
lain, wajar diingat bahawa Akta Pindaan memperuntukkan perubahan forum daripada
mahkamah kepada tribunal. Ketara ini adalah perkara berkaitan prosedur dan
bukannya substantif. Oleh yang demikian ianya adalah berkuatkuasa kebelakangan.
Prinsip ini telah ditegaskan di dalam kes-kes Ramzan Darzi and Others
v. Mst Azizi and Others [1976] Cri LJ 897 dan New India Insurance
Co. Ltd v. Shanti Misra AIR [1976] SC 237. Di dalam kes Ramzan Darzi,
Jaswant Singh CJ di dalam penghakiman majoriti berkata di ms 898 dan 899:
The point that therefore
remains for consideration is whether the choice of forum relates to the
realm of procedure or not. That the choice of forum is a matter of procedure
and is not a matter of substantive right and in most cases a new Act would
have a retrospective effect so far as the choice of forum is concerned
appears to be well settled. Reference in this connection may be made to
a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Hazari Tewari v. Mt. Maktula,
AIR [1932] All 30, where Sulaiman, Ag. CJ while interpreting the new Tenancy
Act which conferred jurisdiction on the revenue court and barred the jurisdiction
of the civil court in the matter of a suit in respect of which adequate
relief could be obtained by way of a revenue suit observed as follows:
The choice of forum
is a matter of procedure and not a substantive right, and in most cases
a new Act would have a retrospective effect so far as the choice of
forum is concerned.
To the same effect is
a decision of the Madras High Court in VC K Bus Service v. HB Sethna
AIR [1965] Mad 149 where it was held as follows:
No litigant has or
can have, vested right in a particular forum. He cannot say as a matter
of right that his suit or application should be tried by this or that
forum which existed on the date his cause of action arose. Forum belongs
to the realm of procedure and does not constitute substantive right
of a party or a litigant. It should also be borne in mind that cause
of action is not to be confused with a forum, and a cause of action,
whatever vested rights it may carry with it, does not include a right
to insist upon a particular court or Tribunal or Judge or any other.
It follows, therefore, that any statutory law which changes a forum,
may not raise a question of retrospective operation, unless, of course
in exceptional cases, it is inseparably intertwined with vested rights.
Di dalam kes New India
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra, supra, Untwalia J menyatakan demikian
di ms 240:
On the plain language
of Sections 110A and 110F there should be no difficulty in taking the
view that the change in law was merely a change of forum ie, a change
of adjectival or procedural law and not of substantive law. It is a well-established
proposition that such a change of law operates retrospectively and the
person has to go to the new forum even if his cause of action or right
of action accrued prior to the change of forum. He will have a vested
right of action but not a vested right of forum. If by express words the
new forum is made available only to causes of action arising after the
creation of the forum, then the retrospective operation of the law is
taken away. Otherwise the general rule is to make it retrospective. The
expressions " arising out of an accident " occurring in sub-section (1)
and " over the area in which the accident occurred " , mentioned in sub-s.
(2) clearly show that the change of forum was meant to be operative retrospectively
irrespective of the fact as to when the accident occurred.
Hujahan pihak perayu bahawa
hak-hak substantifnya adalah terjejas dan Perkara 7(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan
dicabuli adalah pada pendapat mahkamah ini tidak berasas. Perkara 7 berbunyi:
No person shall be punished
for an act or omission which was not punishable by law when it was done
or made, and no person shall suffer greater punishment for an offence
than was prescribed by law at the time it was committed.
Seksyen 16AD pula memperuntukkan
seperti berikut:
(1) Any person who fails
to comply with an award made by the Tribunal within the period specified
therein commits an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine
not exceeding five thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding two years or to both.
(2) In the case of a
continuing offence, the offender shall, in addition to the penalties under
subsection (1), be liable to a fine not exceeding one thousand ringgit
for each day or part of a day during which the offence continues after
conviction.
Mahkamah ini bersetuju
bahawa s. 16AD memperuntukkan liabiliti baru ke atas pemaju dan pembeli
rumah jika mereka gagal mematuhi award tribunal. Tetapi liabiliti ini adalah
berkuatkuasa secara prospektif. Justeru itu seksyen itu tidak melanggar
Perkara 7 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Walaubagaimana pun, kemungkiran perjanjian
bukanlah suatu kesalahan jenayah di bawah seksyen itu. Yang menjadi kesalahan
jenayah ialah ketidakpatuhan kepada award tribunal dan ianya tidak dalam
apa-apa keadaan pun boleh berkuatkuasa kebelakangan kerana tribunal hanya
dapat memberi award selepas 1 Disember 2002. Pada pendapat mahkamah ini
s. 16AD adalah tidak relevan kepada bidang kuasa tribunal.
Kami dengan itu telah
sebulat suara memutuskan bahawa tribunal mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar
tuntutan yang timbul daripada perjanjian yang dimasuki sebelum 1 Disember
2002 dan s. 16AD adalah juga terpakai kepada perjanjian yang dimasuki sebelum
tarikh tersebut. Justeru itu rayuan perayu telah ditolak.
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