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STEVEN PHOA CHENG LOON & ORS V. HIGHLAND
PROPERTIES SDN BHD & ORS
HIGH COURT MALAYA, KUALA LUMPUR
JAMES FOONG J
[CIVIL SUIT NO: S5-21-174-1996]
11 AUGUST 2000
[Plaintiffs' claim against 6th, 9th and 10th defendants dismissed with
costs; plaintiffs' claim for negligence and nuisance against other
defendants allowed with costs; apportionment of contribution -1st defendant
15%, 2nd defendant 10%, 3rd defendant 10%, 4th defendant 15%, 5th defendant
30%, 7th & 8th defendants 20%; damages to be assessed.]
JUDGMENT
James Foong J:
Introduction
Highland Towers, as is collectively known, consist of three blocks 12
storey high apartments named simply as block 1, 2, and 3 respectively. It
was constructed sometime between 1975 and 1978 and the residents who dwelled
therein were middle income earners. Directly behind the three blocks was a
rather steep hill with a stream flowing west, if it was allowed to follow
its natural course. The attraction of this place was the natural
surroundings with an extensive view of the city of Kuala Lumpur.
On Saturday, 11 December 1993, at about 1.30pm, after ten days of
continuous rainfall, block 1 collapsed. When rescue operation was called off
after days of searching, 48 people were recorded dead. The nation declared
this incident as a - national tragedy.
Immediately after the collapse of Block 1 the residents of Block 2 & 3
were prevented from entering their apartments by the local authority having
jurisdiction of the area, the Majlis Perbandaran Ampang Jaya (MPAJ), for
fear of the instability of these two buildings. A couple of days later,
these occupants were allowed in, in restricted number, but only to collect
their personal valuables. At that time, even with the presence of the
security forces, the apartments were looted. With the eventual passing of
time especially when security was reduced and subsequently withdrawn
altogether vandalism became more intense. By 1998, when this court visited
the site, every apartment in Block 2 & 3 was completely stripped of
contents, including fittings leaving only the naked structure.
MPAJ had issued statutory notice to the purchasers/owners of the
apartments of Block 2 & 3 to demolish these two buildings. This was refused
leading to the affected purchasers/owners obtaining from the High Court at
Shah Alam an order to set aside this notice. To date Block 2 & 3 remain
standing but unoccupied for fear of instability.
Some three years after the Highland Towerstragedy the purchasers/owners
of Block 2 & 3 issued a writ against ten defendants. This is the case
against them.
The Defendants
The ten defendants are as follows:
The 1st defendant was the developer of the three apartment blocks in
Highland Towersand is still the registered owner of the three pieces of land
- Lot 494, 495, & 653 in the Mukim of Hulu Klang, District of Gombak, State
of Selangor, on which the buildings stood. For purposes of demarcation, I
shall refer to this entire land as the Highland Towers
Site.
The 2nd defendant was the purported architect of
Highland Towers.
The 3rd defendant, a brother of the 2nd defendant, was the engineer for
Highland Towers.
The 4th defendant is and was the local authority at the material time who
had jurisdiction over the Highland Towers Site,
the Arab Malaysian Land and the surrounding areas.
The 5th defendant is and was, at the material time, the registered owner
of 50 lots of bungalow land directly at the rear of
Highland Towers. I shall collectively refer to these lots as the Arab
Malaysian Land.
The 6th defendant (Tropic) is a company that carried out clearing works
on the Arab Malaysian Land in late 1978 and early 1979.
The 7th defendant is the registered owner of a large piece of land (Metrolux
Land) which is situated on top of a ridge, commonly known as Bukit
Antarabangsa. This land is located just above the Arab Malaysian Land and at
the material time was under development.
The 8th defendant is and, at all material times, the provider of
management services to the 7th defendant to develop the Metrolux Land into a
housing estate.
The 9th defendant is the State Government Selangor.
The 10th defendant is the Director of Lands & Mines of the Selangor
State.
The Plaintiffs' Claim
The plaintiffs' claim is for damages caused jointly and/or severally by
the acts and/or omissions of the defendants, their servants and/or agents in
causing and/or contributing to the collapse of Block 1 and thereby forcing
the plaintiffs to evacuate and abandon Block 2 & 3.
The causes of action relied on by the plaintiffs against the defendants
are: negligence, nuisance, the liability under Rylands v. Fletcher;
and breach of statutory duty.
During the course of the plaintiffs' submission, Mr. Navaratnam, the
leading counsel for the plaintiffs, announced that the plaintiffs are
abandoning the last cause of action - breach of statutory duty, leaving only
negligence, nuisance and liability under Rylands v. Fletcher.
At this stage I am of the view that it is pertinent to set out broadly
the principles governing these causes of actions so that this court will be
focus when analysing the allege liabilities of the defendants. An
amplification of them will be undertaken when I examine each defendant's
acts in detail.
Negligence
The liability of negligence as defined by Lord Atkin in case of
Donoughue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 is: that every man must take
reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which he can reasonably foresee
would be likely to injure his neighbour, ie, those persons who are so
closely and directly affected by his act that he ought reasonably to have
them in contemplation as being so affected when he is directing his mind to
the acts or omissions which are called to question, and this results in
damage to the neighbour. By this, suffice to say, at this stage, that the
important elements for the plaintiffs to prove in this cause of action are:
causation and foreseeability.
Nuisance
In general, nuisance is a condition or activity which unduly interferes
with the use or enjoyment of one's land. There is public nuisance and
private nuisance. In this case we are only concerned with private nuisance
which is often described as "unlawful interference with a person's use or
enjoyment of land, or some right over, or in connection with it", and this
takes three forms. The first: is encroachment on a neighbour's land. The
second: is direct physical injury to the neighbour's land. And the third: is
interference with the enjoyment of the neighbour's land - see Winfield &
Jolowicz on Tort, 15th edn at p. 494.
But not all types of nuisance are actionable. Whether a nuisance is
actionable depends on a variety of considerations: the character of the
defendant's conduct, the act complained of, the effect of the complained act
and such likes. And all these are to be balanced off against the conflicting
interests of the parties; that of an occupier in using his land as he thinks
fit with that of his neighbour for the quiet enjoyment of his land.
In deciding the defendant's conduct, the test is: reasonableness ie,
"according to the ordinary usage of mankind living in 205 a particular
society" - see Sedleigh-Denfield v. O'Callaghan [1940] AC 880 at 903.
This factor of "reasonableness" of the defendant's conduct is different from
that in negligence. Here it signifies what is legally right between the
parties taking account "all the circumstances of the particular case; the
time and place of its commission, the seriousness of the harm, the manner of
committing it, whether it was done maliciously or in the reasonable exercise
of rights; and the effect of the commission, that is transitory or
permanent, occasional or continuous; so that it is a question of fact
whether or not a nuisance has been committed" - Winfield & Jolowicz on
Tort, 15th edn at pp. 497-8.
Thus "if the defendant is a reasonable user, he would not be liable for
consequent harm to his neighbour's enjoyment of his land; but if the user is
not reasonable, the defendant will be liable, even though he may have
exercised reasonable care and skill to avoid it." - Lord Goff in
Cambridge Water Co Ltd v. Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 1 All ER
53 at 70.
Of late another factor is added to this test. It is expounded by the
House of Lords in the same case of Cambridge Water Co Ltd. Lord Goff
introduced it in this way:
We are concern with the liability of a person where a nuisance has been
created by one for whose action he is responsible. Here, as I have said, it
is still the law that the fact that the defendant has taken all reasonable
care will not of itself exonerate him from liability, the relevant control
mechanism being founded within the principle of reasonable user. But it by
no means follows that the defendant should be held liable for damage of a
type which he could not reasonably foresee; and the development of the law
of negligence in the last sixty years points strongly towards the
requirement that such foreseeability should be a prerequisite of liability
in damages for nuisance, as it is of liability in negligence.
For if a plaintiff in ordinary circumstances only able to claim damages
in respect of personal injuries where he can prove foreseeability on the
part of the defendant, it is difficult to see why, in common justice, he
should be in a stronger position to claim damages for interference with the
enjoyment of his land where the defendant was unable to foresee such damage.
I find this added requirement reasonable and I have no reason for not
adopting it as part of the common law of this country for this cause of
action.
The Liability Under Rylands v. Fletcher
The rule expounded by Blackburn J in the case of Rylands v. Fletcher
is: "that the person who for his own purpose brings onto his land and
collects and keeps there anything to do with mischief if it escapes must
keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its
escape." When such a situation is found to exist, then there is no necessity
for the plaintiff to prove the negligent act of the defendant; this is a
case of strict liability.
However this rule has undergone changes in recent years in the common law
practicing countries. Starting with England, the House of Lords, in
Cambridge Water Co Ltd v. Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 1 All ER
53 has added to this principle the necessity to prove that the defendant
could have reasonably foresee the thing might, if escape, cause damage to
the plaintiff. Then in Australia, in the case of Burnie Port Authority v.
General Jones Pty Ltd 120 ALR 42, the High Court after describing this
rule as having "all its difficulties, uncertainty, qualifications and
exception" completely discarded it as an independent cause of action, and
incorporated it into the law of negligence. I tend to favour this Australian
approach since after the case of Cambridge Water Co the requirement
of foreseeability has deprived this independent cause of action of its
attractiveness. Since foreseeability is required to be proved, it might as
well be absorbed into the liability of negligence.
Objection To The Locus Standi Of Plaintiffs Number 44-73
The statement of claim has described plaintiffs 44 to 73 as having
assigned their rights and interest in their respective apartments in
Highland Towers to various financial
institutions for consideration of loans granted to them by these financial
institutions. The names of these financial houses are disclosed in para. 2
of the statement of claim against the amount owed by each of these
plaintiffs. As security for these loans, these plaintiffs have executed in
favour of these institutions what we commonly called a "loan agreement cum
assignment". In it, these plaintiffs assigned to these institutions all
their rights and interest in their apartments under the sale and purchase
agreement they entered with the 1st defendant. This method of conveyancing
was adopted for reason that no individual strata title was issued to the
apartments (not even till today) to enable the financiers to create a legal
charge over them. Seizing on this shortcoming all the defendants except
Tropic argued that these 59 plaintiffs have no right to bring an action
against the defendants since their rights have been assumed by the financial
institutions.
To substantiate this contention s. 4(3) of the Civil Law Act and the
principle as laid down in the case of Leigh & Sillavan v. Aliakmon
Shipping Co Ltd [1986] 2 All ER 145 are highlighted.
Section 4(3) of the Civil Law Act reads as follows:
Any absolute assignment, by writing, under the hand of the assignor, not
purporting to be by way of charge only, of any debt or other legal chose in
action, of which express notice in writing has been given to the debtor,
trustee or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to
receive or claim the debt or chose in action, shall be, and be deemed to
have been, effectual in law, subject to all equities which would have been
entitled to priority over the right of the assignee under the law as it
existed in the State before the date of the coming into force of this Act,
to pass and transfer the legal right to the debt or chose in action, from
the date of the notice, and all legal and other remedies for the same, and
the power to give good discharge for the same, without the concurrence of
the assignor (emphasis added).
And the principle as expressed by Lord Brandon in Leigh & Sillavan v.
Aliakmon Shipping (supra) is:
in order to enable a person to claim in negligence for loss caused to
him by reason of loss or damage to property, he must have either the legal
ownership of or a possessory title to the property concerned at the time
when the loss or damage occurred, and it is not enough for him to have only
had contractual rights in relation to such property which have been
adversely affected by the loss or damage to it (emphasis added).
In arguing against this objection, Mr. Navaratnam, insists that the
assignments executed by his clients to the financial institutions are
firstly: "not absolute", and secondly: "purporting to be by way of charge",
thus falling outside the ambit of s. 4(3) of the Civil Law Act.
By these assertions, the question that requires satisfaction, and which
will decide the fate of the defendants' objections, is: whether the
assignments in favour of the financial bodies are absolute (not purporting
to be a way of charge)? If it is in the negative, then the objections of
these defendants must fail.
As a guide to assist this court in its determination of this issue two
decisions, one from the then Supreme Court (Nouvau Mont Dor (m) Sdn. Bhd.
V. Faber Development Sdn. Bhd. [1985] CLJ 231), and the other of the
Federal Court (HiPParion (m) Sdn. Bhd. V. Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd. [1989] 1
CLJ 41) confirming the approach of its predecessor, are relevant. In the
case of Nouvau Mont Dor (m) Sdn. Bhd. V. Faber Development Sdn. Bhd.
[1985] CLJ 231, Seah FJ advises that: in deciding on such matter of,
"whether or not the assignment is absolute one (not purporting to be by way
of a legal charge only) within the meaning of s. 4(3) of the Civil Law Act
1956 is to be gathered only from the four corners of the instrument itself".
It must be recorded that in both these cases, the assignments by the
borrowers to the banks for loans granted of this nature were ruled absolute
(and not purporting to be by way of a legal charge only) rendering the
assignors no legal right to bring an action in their own names.
Of late there seems to be substantial number of authorities
distinguishing the finding made in Nouvau Mont Dor and Hipparion,
though not the test they set. Particularly visible are the High Courts'
decisions in Loh Hoon Loi & Ors v. Viewpoint Properties (Sabah) Sdn Bhd
[1995] 4 MLJ 804, Bank of Commence (M) Bhd v. Mahajaya Property Sdn Bhd
[1997] 3 MLJ 620 and Pak Ki Yau v. Kumpulan Promista Sdn Bhd [1999] 6
MLJ 220. The two latter cases ruled that there was no absolute assignment in
the document of assignments before them.
The various instruments of assignment created by these plaintiffs in
favour of their respective financial institutions are tendered in court.
Though they are worded in various fashions, but common to all are the
following features: (a) It is in consideration for loans granted by the
financial institutions to these plaintiffs, as borrowers. (b) There are no
individual documents of title issued to the apartments offered as securities
for the loans to enable a legal charge to be created over them. (c) The
assignments by these plaintiffs to the financial institutions are of the
plaintiffs' rights and interest in the sale and purchase agreements they
entered with the 1st defendant, when they purchased their respective
apartments. (d) There are covenants by these financial institutions, as
assignors, to reassign the said apartments back to the plaintiffs in the
event individual documents of title are issued, and if the loans are still
then subsisting, to create registrable legal charges over the properties so
secured. (e) And if individual documents of title were not issued when the
loans are repaid the assignors would reassign back the rights and interest
in the sale & purchase agreements to the plaintiffs.
This type of arrangement is presently recognised as an "equitable
mortgage" or even as a "equitable charge" by the Federal Court in the case
of Chuah Eng Khong V. Malayan Banking Berhad [1995] 3 CLJ 581. In
fact Peh Swee Chin's FCJ in his judgment in the same case accepted such
creation despite the existence in this country of the National Land Code
which speaks only of a "charge" with the following statement:
The Court of Appeal used the words "equitable mortgage" in relation to
security transaction without restraint, and totally without inhibition in
the face of the National Land Code.
We support such usage.
With recognition by such high authority of such loan agreement cum
assignment to be an equitable charge, I see no reason why the word "charge"
in s. 4(3) of the Civil Law Act should not include equitable charge of this
nature. For after all, is this equitable charge not specie of a charge? Thus
when this instrument of assignment purports to be by way of a charge, the
effects of s. 4(3) of the Civil Law Act is no longer applicable.
Further, after perusing these loan agreement cum assignments, I honestly,
within the four corners of these documents cannot interpret them to be
absolute assignments by these plaintiffs to the financial institutions.
Though the word "absolute" appears in the documentation of these loan
agreement cum assignments, there are also other clauses to show that the
rights and interest in the sale & purchase agreements so assigned have not
been transferred to the assignors. This is explicitly revealed Clement
Skinner JC (as he then was) in Pak Ki Yau v. Kumpulan Promista Sdn Bhd
(supra). Though the clauses referred by Skinner JC in his judgment may
not be exactly the same in wordings and in numerical order as those in the
various loan agreement cum assignments in our present case but they are
present and practically alike. The following is his exposition of which I
adopt in full for the consideration in this case.
Clause 19 in particular permits or recognises that the appellants
(plaintiffs in our case) may execute or create a further or subsequent
assignment, charge, mortgage or encumbrance over the said property or any
part thereof, and to do so would not constitute an event of default; the
only sanction such an event invites is that the bank is entitled to open a
separate account and any money repaid by the appellants is paid into such
new account and will not be treated as a repayment of the loan. In my view,
a clause such as the above which allows the appellants to exercise rights
over the said property as if he is still the owner thereof, must surely by
strong indication mean that the parties did not intend the assignment to be
absolute. In addition to the above, cll. 15, 26 and 33 all recognised the
appellants are entitled to have possession of and enjoy the said property
except that the appellants are obliged to insure, maintain and upkeep the
same. If the assignment was intended to be absolute so as to transfer all
rights, title and interest in the said property, as contented for by the
respondent, then the appellants' occupation and use of the said property
would only be possible with the permission and licence of the respondent.
Yet, there are no word in the loan cum assignment that indicates that the
position of the appellants are that of a licensee.
With this, and the reason as expressed earlier, my answer to the question
posed earlier is in the negative. This paves the way for these plaintiffs to
pursue with their claims.
Besides the finding above, I am also of the view that by the principle of
equity of redemption these plaintiffs are also able to maintain their right
to sue. Though the defendants concerned have submitted to me that this
equitable principle has no place in our system of land registration since
1917, as expressed in Haji Abdul Rahman v. Md. Hassan [1917] 1 FMSLR
290 and approved by the FMS Court of Appeal in Wong See Leng V. C
Saraswathy Ammal [1953] 1 LNS 123 which says:
It seems to their Lordships that the learned judges have been too much
swayed by the doctrines of English equity, and not paid sufficient attention
to the fact that they were dealing with a totally different land law, namely
a system of registration of title contained in a codifying enactment.
The very phase 'equity of redemption' is quite inapplicable in the
circumstances.
I find that this attitude have changed by the decision of the Federal
Court in Chuah Eng Khong V. Malayan Banking Berhad [1995] 3 CLJ 581.
There, Peh Swee Chin FCJ has categorically revived this principle with
these:
If it is an equitable mortgage, like a legal mortgage, the borrower has
obtained a second right to redeem after the contractual date for redemption
has expired, i.e. he has got equity of redemption for, in the eyes of
equity, the lender is not the owner of the said land notwithstanding the
said assignment, but the borrower is, but subject to mortgage, and the
lender a mere "encumbrancer". The equity of redemption arises as soon as any
document on a true construction is found to be a mortgage.
The word "mortgage" may sound like sacrilege in view of the presence of the
Code which does not use the word, especially to a legal man who specialises
in "common law" but not to one who is familiar with "Chancery practice"; for
the latter; despite the assignment, the borrower is still the owner of the
land subject to the mortgage.
The learned judge then proceeds to determine as follows:
Although there is a well-known distinction between a mortgage where a
borrower's land is usually transferred or assigned subject to the equity of
redemption and a charge where such land is not transferred or assigned at
all but it gives the chargee rights over the land, a charge of land has
always been regarded as a species of mortgage for most practical purposes,
see "Law of Real Property" by Sir Robert Megarry (former Vice
Chancellor of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom) and HSR Wade,
5th Ed, at p. 914.
The Court of Appeal used the words "equitable mortgage" in relation to
security transaction without restrain, and totally without any inhibition in
the face of the National Land Code.
We support such usage.
Here the said loan agreement, on true construction, is an equitable charge,
as there is no deposit of document of title 205
Since the loan agreement cum assignment is an equitable mortgage the
principle of the equity of redemption is back in force in this country; with
it comes the right of these plaintiffs to proceed with their claims.
The Cause Of Collapse Of Block 1
In order to determine the liabilities of defendants on the allegations as
charged by the plaintiffs, it is necessary at the onset to establish the
cause of the collapse of Block 1 which lead to the forced evacuation Block 2
& 3. To decide on this, it is essential to disclose some brief facts.
Highland Towers & Its Surrounding
Features
The Retaining Walls
The three apartment blocks of Highland Towers
were built on elevated land with a relatively flat base. Directly behind it
was a steep hill. Though some witnesses have describe the gradient of this
hill to be 10 to 20 degrees but, by my estimate from various photographs
tendered as exhibits, I perceive it to be far steeper. This hill was
terraced, supported by retaining rubble walls made of boulders and cobbles
of rock of varying size placed together by mortar at a random fashion. Some
of these walls had collapsed and were buried in the soil at the time of the
Highland Towers tragedy. Those left are still
standing, either in part or as a whole, but in a dire state of repair. From
a physical survey commissioned by MPAJ soon after the collapse of Block 1 on
the affected area, covering the Highland Towers
Site and the Arab Malaysian Land, it is apparent that these retaining walls
were constructed in a haphazardous manner. Some were located on the
Highland Towers Site with the rest in the Arab
Malaysian Land.
Ownership Of The Slope Behind Highland Towers
Both the Highland Towers Site and the Arab
Malaysian Land once belonged to a common owner - the 1st defendant, who
intended to develop the entire area into a housing scheme with three
apartment blocks on Highland Towers Site and
bungalows on the Arab Malaysian Land. When the lands were subdivided and
issued with individual documents of title, the 1st defendant mortgaged the
bungalow lots, consisting of 50 in number, to the 5th defendant in
consideration of some financial arrangements. When the loans were not
repaid, the 50 bungalow lots were transferred to the 5th defendant in
November 1991 to offset the amount due.
The East Stream & Pipe Culvert
At the furthest eastern corner of the Arab Malaysian Land water from a
stream, popularly known as the "East Stream" (which name is totally
inappropriate since it actually flows westward), enters the 5th defendant
land. The source of this stream originates from the Metrolux Land. It flows
down hill in a westerly direction until it reaches a plateau where it forms
a mud pond. From here the water is channeled into a set of concrete culverts
which directs it to a pipe culvert (pipe culvert). This pipe culvert runs
horizontally right across the hill slope of the Arab Malaysian Land. After
passing through 10 bungalow lots, the water from this pipe is discharged
into Lot 445 which is situated in the north. Lot 445 is a government land.
This entire section of the land, as described, seems unaffected by the
effects of the landslide that brought down Block 1.
The initial section of this pipe culvert was built as an integrated part
of a retaining wall. It has manholes located at various intervals. Just by
the side of this pipe culvert, running for some distance, is an open
concrete drain. This was intended to drain surface runoff water while the
pipe culvert catered for the water emanating from the East Stream.
All drainage and geo-technical experts who testified in this case agree
that the flow regime of the East Stream into the pipe culvert running across
the hill is highly undesirable and dangerous. Instead of water flowing along
its natural course - downhill (following its natural terrain), it is now
diverted into a man made structure that requires constant maintenance and
supervision. Failure to attend to this will affect slope stability, causing
a danger to humans living down slope. It must have been this concern that,
subsequent to the collapse of Block 1, the rescue operators, upon
discovering this unwarranted drainage system of the East Stream, redirected
the flow pattern of this stream to its natural course, downhill in a
westerly direction. They did it by placing sandbags in an area to prevent
the flow of water into the pipe culvert. This is not completely successful
since, by my observation during this court's visit to the area, water is
still detected in the pipe culvert.
Further down slope on the Arab Malaysian Land is network of drains. Those
at the upper sector are earth drains while at the lower portion are made of
concrete. These drains, I believed cater for surface water runoff while the
pipe culvert was take care of the discharge emanating from the East Stream.
Though in certain areas these drains are disconnected abruptly, presumably
caused by the landslide that brought down Block1, those at the upper level
are still intact. But they are in an odd fashion. Starting from the top, a
drain runs parallel for some distance along the pipe culvert. It then
suddenly makes a U-turn to flow back in the same direction from where it
came from. Then after proceeding for some distance, it is connected to a
culvert across a road reserve. At this culvert and joining it is a drain
coming from the opposite direction. By deduction, this drain from the
opposite caters for water runoff on the southern side of the slope. From the
junction the drain proceeds down hill and terminates abruptly at far right
at a level parallel to the rear of Highland Towers.
From an overall view of the post-collapse survey plan, this drain must have
continued along the rear of Highland Towers
until the end of Block 3 when it turned left down hill and drained into the
lower section of the government land - Lot 445.
This drainage pattern too, in the view of all experts in the field of
hydrology, is far from satisfactory. Firstly, large section of drains is
earth drains that can be easily eroded. Secondly, water can infiltrate into
the soil of these earth drains at a greater rate than those made of
concrete. Thirdly, the flow pattern of these drains is undesirable. It does
not flow naturally down hill. Instead it makes a number of U-turns, one of
which even flows backwards to the direction where it came from. Fourthly,
the drains are insufficient to accommodate the amount of runoff from the
slope. Fifthly, the drains are in a vegetated area and maintenance is
regularly and constantly required.
Before the Arab Malaysian Land was sold to the 5th defendant, one Mr. Lim
(DW1), an employee of the 1st defendant was in charge of the drains on the
slope. He ensured water in the drains flowed without interruptions,
particularly free from vegetation interference around it, and when the
drains were damaged he would repair them. Failure or neglect to ensure these
had serious consequences as can witnessed by the flooding in the car parks
of Highland Towers accompanied by rocks and mud,
as well as a landslide on the slope some months before the collapse of Block
1. This was when Tropic moved into the Arab Malaysian Land to excavate and
cleared the vegetation as well as leaving branches of trees and debris in
the drains.
Bruce Mitchell's Photographs
The three blocks of Highland Towers were
built in such a manner that Block 1 and 3 were almost parallel to each
other, with Block 2 in between set slightly back. From the window of the of
the 4th floor of Block 3, a resident, Mr. Bruce Mitchell, had the presence
of mind to snap a series of photographs just before the collapsed of Block
1. These highly commendable pictures, 6 in number, recorded the tragedy and
rendered us a grime reminder of the last moments before the disaster that
took so many lives and caused enormous loss of property. These pictures also
provided invaluable information to specialist in the field of geo-technology
to determine the cause of the collapse. They are marked as exhibit P7A - 7H
but are commonly, throughout this trial, referred to as the "Mitchell
Pictures".
As principal expert witnesses have relied extensively on these pictures
to form their opinion, it is essential that I give a brief description of
each of these.
Photograph P7A, shows a view of the rear section of
Highland Towers framed on both sides by the balconies of apartments
in Block 1 & 2. At the furthest end of the picture is the hill slope.
Erosion scars are seen in two areas engulfed by vegetation, mainly trees
which lean downhill as if being pushed by some force from above. Beneath is
a rubble retaining wall. In front of this wall is a heap of earth with
fragments of tar spawn over. Lower down from this spot is a continuous row
of corrugated asbestos roofs in a state of collapse, with motor vehicles
trapped under. Right next to this and slightly further front, is a cement
slap which looks like an openair badminton court. Supporting it is a rubble
retaining wall topped by flower plants.
The left side of picture P7B shows a partial profile of Block 1 with some
balconies of apartments facing Kuala Lumpur City protruding out. Beneath
these is a tar-paved road with three motor cars parked in a row. At the far
end of this road is a rubble retaining wall supporting a growth of lush
green vegetation. The lower portion of this retaining wall has explored with
soil spawn over a lower tier road. A lamppost standing close to the area
where the soil is seen emitting has leaned.
Photograph P7C is the second frame of the same spot as P7B. The soil seen
emitting in the earlier picture it is more profound. Substantial part of the
retaining wall has collapsed. Greater volume of earth is seen gushing out of
the disintegrated retaining wall. The lamppost has leaned more extreme.
P7D captures almost the entire Block 1 tilted at an angle with clouds of
dust emitting from the base.
P7E records Block 1 almost tumbling to the ground. The rear apartments'
balconies, now facing the sky are clearly visible.
P7F is a second frame of the same spot as P7E. In this subsequent shot,
taken a few seconds later, there is a sea of dust with intermittent sight of
a fallen building.
P7G reveals a wider view of the rear of Block 1 without the building
(Block 1) obstructing. The dust from the fallen Block 1 is still present as
evidenced by the white cloudily shades on the right side of the picture. In
the center, starting from the top is the hill slope marked by scars
extending to the right in a continuous line. Below, divided by a row of
vegetation, is a rubble retaining wall that is still standing but split in
the middle and slanting. In front of this is a large mess of expose earth,
and floating on top are some cars with parts of the corrugated roof, which
once provided a shade for the car park. At the extreme left of this
photograph stands Block 2, with its landscaped terraced garden fully intact.
P7H is a pathetic view of the collapsed Block 1 lying on the ground in
one piece with stunned spectators staring at the aftermath in total
disbelief.
Investigation & MPAJ Report
General
Immediately after the collapse of Block 1 rescue operation was mounted.
MPAJ who had administrative responsibility over the area assumed a leading
role. It set up a Commission of Inquiry (Commission of Inquiry) headed by
its President. This Commission consisted of representatives from various
government departments and professional bodies (like the Boards of
architects and engineers) relevant to the scope of the enquiry. The term of
reference of this Commission was to: determine the cause of the collapse,
identify the person or persons responsible, with recommendations on actions
that could be taken against him or them; make recommendations on measures to
prevent reoccurrence of such an accident; and to make assessment and
recommendations on the fate of Block 2 & 3.
The Commission divided its work into various committees which in turn
spread out its task to a number of sub-committees. At the end of three
months from date of inception, this Commission published a report. It is in
five volumes. For ease of reference, I refer to it as the "MPAJ report".
When the plaintiffs' counsel attempted to tender this document in court to
be marked as an exhibit some defendants raised objections. This is
understandable. The Commission of Inquiry, after identifying the cause of
collapse, also attributed faults to certain defendants. Such findings,
according to the affected defendants, is unfair since they were not
represented at the inquiry nor given an opportunity to test the validity of
the evidence adduced. It is pertinent to note that included in this report
are numerous data, plans, maps and information gathered by the investigating
section of the committee immediately after the collapse. These are useful
and offer enormous assistance to any expert in determining the cause of the
collapse of Block 1. In fact all the experts called to testify before me
had, in one form or other, relied on some of the plans, maps, and
information and data contained in the MPAJ report to formulate their expert
opinion.
The Admissibility Of The MPAJ Report
To determine this issue on the admissibility of this MPAJ report I called
for submission from both sides. After hearing arguments, I ruled that this
report is admissible and ordered it to be marked as P47 to P52.
To justify this the following are my reasons. It is set in the format of
question & answer.
1. Question: Is the MPAJ report a public document as defined under s. 74
of the Evidence Act?
Answer: Yes, it is for reason that it falls within the definition of s.
74(a)(ii) of the Evidence Act which states:
The following documents are public documents: documents forming
the acts or records of the acts of - official bodies and tribunals.
2. Question: Is MPAJ an official body within the term - "public bodies"
as set out in the specific section of the Act referred above?
Answer: Yes, it is for reason that in s. 78(1)(e) of the Evidence Act,
which relates to the tendering of such public document, local authority is
specifically mentioned in following manner:
The following public documents may be proved as follows: the proceedings
of a municipal body, town board or local authority in Malaysia - by a copy
of the proceedings certified by the lawful keeper thereof, or by a printed
book purported to be published by the authority of the body. (emphasis
added) 3. Question: Is the MPAJ report a proceeding of the local authority?
Answer: Yes it is for reason that MPAJ, being a local authority, under s.
28 of the Local Government Act:
pay from time to time appoint committees, either of a general or special
nature, consisting of the chairman and such number of the Councilors and
such other persons as the local authority may think fit, for the purpose of
examining and reporting upon any matter or performing any act which in the
opinion of the local authority would be more conveniently performed by means
of a Committee, and may delegate to any Committee such powers, other than
the power to raise money by rates or loans, as it may think fit, and may fix
the quorum of any such committee,
and the act of such committee in producing such a report must be
considered as a proceedings of MPAJ.
4. Question: Has the plaintiffs proved this document for the purpose of
admission as evidence in this proceeding?
Answer: Yes. The MPAJ report is in a printed book published by the
authority of that body.
5. Question: What is the probative value to be attached to the contents
of this MPAJ report?
Answer: By the Indian authority of Tara Kumar Ghose v. Kumar Arun
Chandra Singh 74 IC 383: A 1923 C 161, the High Court of Calcutta
expressed that:
it must be recognised that the question whether a document is admissible
in evidence as a public document is fundamentally distinct from the question
whether its contents are binding upon the tenants without proof of notice on
them or of their consent.
Though this Indian case involves the proving or disproving the existence
of tenancies to receive protection under some rent control enactment in
India, the principle expressed therein is sound and logical. I am persuaded
to adopt it for application to the circumstances of our case.
With this, I am of the view that though the MPAJ report is admitted as
evidence, the findings made therein, as well as opinions expressed have
still to be evaluated. And unless these are tested by the due process of the
procedural law ie, by examination of witness or witnesses who
personally form such opinions or made such findings, then very little weight
shall be attached when this court is asked to evaluate them.
Except for Dr. Nik Ramlan, who was a member of the Commission of Inquiry
and the head of the technical committee but was not personally involved in
formulating the opinions and findings, and the MPAJ architect, who acted as
the secretary for the Commission, no other members from this body or its
various sub-committees were called to testify. This leaves the conclusions,
findings, interpretations and opinions expressed in this MPAJ report quite
valueless except for the data, plans, maps and information, which most
parties made use of. Since these were accepted without objections, I shall
consider them on the basis as documents agreed upon by all parties
concerned.
The Theories Of Slope Failure
With sufficient disclosure above, I shall now proceed to analyse the
cause of the failure of Block 1. There are basically two conflicting
theories advanced: one from the plaintiffs and the other from the 5th
defendant. Experts in the field of geo-technology were called to
substantiate these. Supporting the plaintiffs' contention is Dr. Weeks
(PW9), and on the side of the 5th defendant, is Professor Simons (DW11). The
significance of these two theories is the belief that it will affect the
liabilities of the parties, particularly of the 1st and 5th defendant. If
Dr. Week's version is accepted, then it is contented that the cause of
failure emanated from the 5th defendant's land. Professor Simon, on the
other hand, insists that it originated from the 1st defendant's property.
Though both are defendants, but only one is of substance. This is the 5th
defendant, which is a financial institution as compared to the 1st
defendant, a company that was wound up when submission was coming to an end.
Thus, both the plaintiffs and the 5th defendant spent enormous energy in
attempting to convince me to their side of their belief.
Dr. Week's Theory
Dr. Weeks commences his testimony with an explanation of the factors
associated with slope stability when soil in the area consists of mainly
sand or sandy materials. He says that the three factors governing slope
stability are: firstly, the slope angle or the angle of the slope; secondly,
the shear strength; and thirdly, the pore water pressure. In respect of
shear strength, he explains that this is the strength of the soil material
before it slips. It is technically described as the relationship between
force weight and friction. In short, if you know the weight of the soil you
would know the force needed to cause a slip of that soil. Pore water
pressure is when water infiltrates into the sand, it fills up the pores of
the sand particles. Due to the height of the sand on top of each other,
pressure is asserted. This, in turn causes the grain of sand to loose
contact with each other and lifts itself - resulting in weight reduction.
When the weight is reduced the sand slips easily. Thus, any increase in pore
water pressure will result in a reduction to the resistance in sliding. Much
associated with these factors, is the reaction of sand caused by suction.
Dr. Weeks illustrates this with the experience of a mold created by an
upended bucket of beach sand. It is unstable when dry; when damp it will
stay; yet with too much water it will slide or topple over.
With the aforesaid preliminaries, Dr. Weeks proceeds to declare that it
was a series of landslides that brought down Block 1 and these were
primarily caused by - water. According to him, it was a failure of a
retaining wall on the upper slope of the 5th defendant's land which
initiated a rotational landslide. This in turn triggered off a mantle slide
just below due to the upper layer of the soil in this sector heavily
saturated with water. When the mantle slide came down in one piece it took
whatever was beneath it - the retaining walls, trees, vegetation, car parks,
badminton courts and Block 1. Because of the speed of this mantle slide and
the nature of the soil, being loose or very loose, and the presence of large
amount of water in the soil, he classifies this mantle slide into a special
category - called a flowslide.
At this stage there is a necessity to explain the types of landslide
described. A rotational slide: is landslide where a failed landmass comes
down in a rotational manner ie, the toe of the slip is forced out and
reverts backwards in a curve. A mantle slide: is when a failure involves
only the upper layer of the soil. As for a flowslide, it is a mantle slide
but has the characteristic of speed, material being loose or very loose, and
the depth of failure is relatively shallow depth with presence of
substantial amount of water.
To support his theory Dr. Weeks relied, firstly, on Dames & Moore's
borehole test. Dames & Moore is a firm of geo-technical engineers engaged by
the 5th defendant to conduct geological test on the
Highland Towers Site and the Arab Malaysian Land after the collapse
of Block 1. At locations where they did the test, results show loose or very
loose sandy soil. Such type of soil, in the opinion of Dr. Weeks, has large
pore space and of low density. It moves close to each other when saturated
with water, causing the pore water pressure to increase. When this happens
there will be a reduction to the resistance in the shear strength of the
soil - causing it to slide.
Secondly, Dr. Weeks relied on the Mitchell's pictures. At photo P7A, on
the top left-hand corner of the building, he points out a scar with mark
edges. This scar is more distinct in photo P7G. This, he claims, is where
the mantle slide originated. Slightly lower, just above the third balcony of
Block 1, counting from the top as shown in the same photo, Dr. Weeks
highlights another scar. This he says, is evidence of the landslide which
originated above had moved downhill. Next, he points to the signs of heaping
and buckling of the ground in front of the rubble wall at the second tier
car park (again revealed in the same photo). With no earth from the rear
overriding or falling from above onto the car park but instead of lifting it
up, Dr. Weeks feels that the landslide was proceeding beneath the ground. He
fortifies this view with the revelation of some cars have shifted to the
front and cracks appearing in the retaining wall that supported the
badminton courts as disclosed in photo P7A. Further, he claims that when
photos P7B & C were shot five seconds later, the retaining wall at the side
of Block 1 had busted. This, to Dr. Weeks, implies that the soil material
was moving very fast and by his calculation - at the speed of 1 1/2 meter
per second. This is based on the fact that the subsequent shot by Bruce
Mitchell in photo P7C, taken of the same area a few seconds later, shows
that the lamppost next to the retaining wall had leaned more extreme and the
wall itself was disintegrating, with soil exploding across the road. Also
found in this picture are cracks appearing on the tar pavement in front of
Block 1. Dr. Weeks insists that these are not only indications of the speed
of the soil movement but the momentum it generated to force the entire Block
1 to move, as shown in photo P7G.
To further support his theory, Dr. Weeks refers to the oral testimony of
Bruce Mitchell. This witness has said that he noticed movement on the hill
slope before he took the photos. He describes it as "like something rippling
beneath". Dr. Weeks interprets this as representing a relatively shallow
landslide of the upper mantle layer taking with it trees, vegetation and
retaining walls on top.
Finally, for evidence of saturation of water on the slope, Dr. Weeks
relies on his own observation during his three visits to the Arab Malaysian
Land where he noticed water flowing in an uncontrolled manner over the
surface of the slope. This he said, is confirmed by various photographs
tendered as exhibits showing water over flowing a retaining wall and the
existence of "ponding" (pools of water) on the ground.
As for the failure of the retaining wall at the upper slope of the 5th
defendant's land which initiated the rotational slide, Dr. Weeks alludes
that this was due to a low factor of safety of this wall and the
uncontrolled water coming down the surface of the slope to cause movement on
the loose or very loose soil material at the spot. By Dr. Week's assessment,
the factor of safety for this retaining wall was only 1.02. This is far
below the accepted geo-technical engineering standard to determine slope
stability which rules that a slope will fail if it has a factor of safety of
1 or less than 1. Factor of safety in simple term means the reserve you have
before failure of a slope.
During the course of trial, Dr. Weeks advances an alternative theory -
that the landslide was caused by the existence of "a perched water table".
He says that he formulated this after his recent revisit to the site where
he discovered new landslide in the area. This caused him to "revisit" the
Dames & Moore data where it shows the presence of clay in the soil at the
Highland Towers Site and Arab Malaysian Land. He
explains that clay being a relatively impermeable substance does not allow
water to infiltrate the soil easily to reach the ultimate ground water
table. When there are lens of clay present in the sub-soil a perched water
table can be formed above. Such perch water table has enormous effect on the
pore water pressure of the loose or very loose soil at the mantle of the
slope causing it to be less resistance to slide.
To support his new alternative theory, Dr. Weeks relies on: (a) the
finding of clay or clayey materials at the sub-level of the slope as
indicated by the soil test from Dames & Moore borehole test; (b) the
relatively high water level recorded by Dames & Moore when the borehole test
was carried out.
As there is a challenge by the 5th defendant on this perception of a
perch water table there is a necessity to explain the technique used to
obtain the data mentioned above. To conduct a bore hole test an instrument
called a standpipe is inserted into a hole drilled to the ground till it
reaches the granite. The purpose is to obtain subterranean soil sample and
to ascertain where the ground water table is. For the latter, the theory
works in this manner. As granite is relatively impermeable water will remain
just above it. This level is considered as the ground water table. Readings
are taken periodically from this standpipe and with a series of standpipes
placed vertically in a row down slope one can chart a graph to determine the
gradient of its flow. The necessity to ascertain this is because the level
where this table is will effect the pore water pressure on the soil material
around it. Also, the pressure of this water table creates pressure against
any retaining wall around it.
Professor Simons's Theory
Professor Simons's theory is less complicated once the characteristic of
the soil material and its relationship to slope failure has been explained.
According to Professor Simons, the collapse of Block 1 was due to the
initial failure of the high rubble retaining wall of 10 to 11 meters
immediately behind the second tier car park. This wall he refers to as the
"High Wall" failed and initiated a series of retrogressive landslides up the
slope behind this wall. Simultaneously a forward movement down slope was
effected. This forward movement down hill created such a surcharge load that
Block 1, with its pile foundation not designed to accommodate any horizontal
load, collapsed, bringing along with it the structure it was supporting.
Professor Simons explains a "retrogressive slide" as a rotational slide
which begins at the bottom of the slope and regresses upward in a series of
rotational slide. Here, each rotational slide is a segment of a limited
failure and it happens next behind the other due to loss of toe support. It
continues progressively up slope, getting less active as it proceeds.
To support his contention, Professor Simons offers the following: First,
the aerial photograph (p. 30 of exh. P48) taken by the Investigation
Committee of the Commission of Inquiry a few days after the collapse of
Block 1. This photo shows a number of scars on the land behind the collapsed
building. "A scar" is interpreted here to mean "a step in the slope with
bare earth". It is the exposed surface of the earth after the ground had
slipped due to weakness and loss of support. According to Professor Simons's
interpretation of this photo, there are four scars. This, in accordance to
authoritative geo-technical engineering text represents a rotational
retrogressive failure beginning from the head scar at the lowest point. The
High Wall, he insists, was located here. Against this is Dr. Week's
interpretation of this photograph. He says there are only two scars. By
this, he claims, is in line with his theory of a rotational slide followed
by a flow slide.
Secondly, by the calculation done by Professor Simons this High Wall had
a very low factor of safety. In his opinion, this High Wall would fail at
the height of five meters without any water pressure acting at the back of
this wall. In fact, his analysis shows all those walls behind Block 1 had
only a factor of safety of 1.52 even on the assumption of no water pressure
was applied against them. This factor of water acting at the back of the
wall has relevance because water at the back of the wall will increase the
thrust on the wall and makes it more vulnerable to collapse. Thus, in his
opinion this High Wall with such a low factor of safety would have easily
failed on its own without any water influence.
Further, according to the words of Professor Simons, "This High Wall
consist of blocks of stone of varying sizes hand plastered in mortar at a
random fashion with no drainage blanket behind it. It does not appear to sit
on any foundation. It just rests directly on the ground ... It is simply not
big and heavy enough to carry earth pressure acting on it, let alone
additional water pressure." Such wall, in his opinion, was very vulnerable
to failure.
Before I proceed further I must express this court's appreciation to the
efforts of Dr. Weeks and Professor Simons in analysing the cause of failure
of Block 1. Though this court may believe one against the other, or even
only accepting part of either theories, but no aspersion is cast on the
integrity, competency and professionalism of both these two men. They are,
in the mind of this court, gentlemen of integrity and great learning in
their chosen discipline. From their c.v. presented, they rank among the top
personalities in the field of geo-technological engineering in this world.
This court has indeed benefited from their expertise.
My Analysis Of These Two Theories
With the views of both these experts forcefully put, I shall now proceed
to analyse the two theories advanced and attempt to come to a conclusion as
to which of the two is more probable.
I shall begin with the aerial photo. This photo, taken just two days
after the collapse of Block 1 by the Investigation Committee of Commission
of Inquiry is already interpreted by the various dotted lines drawn across
the scars. It shows three scars. According to Dr. Nik Ramlan, the person
responsible for this interpretation was a member of the Investigation
Committee and he was qualified to undertake such task. But since this
"interpreter" was not called to testify then such interpretation must be
ignored, leaving for consideration the different versions put forth by the
two experts based on the images captured in the photo. This photograph
proper is not disputed by the parties; what they are only unhappy about is
the interpretation by whoever who drew the lines on it.
After due consideration I am more inclined to adopt Professor Simons's
interpretation. But instead of his conclusion of four scars, I only can
detect three. I base this on the number of exposed naked surfaces
interspersed by the lines of vegetation which must obviously include the
area above the top most scar.
The next matter I shall consider is the soil condition of the failed mess
after the collapsed of Block 1. According to Dr. Weeks, in a mantle
flowslide the soil must be very saturated with loose or very loose material
spreading over a wide area. With such a characteristic one must expect the
area around the collapsed apartment to be wet and muddy. But, from evidence
adduced through various witnesses it is the contrary. Even Bruce Mitchell
who initially described the soil exploding from the side of the retaining
wall of Block 1 to water spurting out from a fire hydrant was forced to
admit that such material looks dry after reviewing his own photos P7B and C.
Proceeding therefrom, I find Dr. Week's reliance on Mitchell's photo P7A
to show the beginning of the mantle flow slide has many flaws. Firstly,
Bruce Mitchell's line of vision from his window in Block 3 was restricted.
What he saw, as reflected in this photo, was a landslide that had already
begun with the High Wall having failed. By "failed", I must adopt Professor
Simons's interpretation to mean, "the ground (beneath it) has failed" even
though "the foundation or structure of the wall may not fail". This explains
the reason why this wall remained upright in photos P7A and G as well as
that in p. 36 of P49. These pictures show this wall in a slanting position
but not disintegrated. But effectively, this wall had failed since it was no
longer capable of fulfilling its purpose of retaining soil behind it. Bruce
Mitchell in fact did not see this wall failing, in the sense as described
above, when he shot photo P7A. His line of vision did not extend to the area
where this wall was originally located. His vision was blocked by Block 2.
What he actually saw of the High Wall through photo P7A was after this wall
had moved 16 meters down slope after failing. The heap of earth material in
front of this High Wall must be the effect of a rotational slide where the
surcharge had lifted the earth in front of the failed mass and exposed it at
its toe. Dr. Weeks had attempted to explain the reason why this area heaved
since it is contrary to the characteristic of a mantle flow slide (which
would have brought this part of ground in one piece down slope). He said
that this location being dry, due to the tar surface of the car park,
prevented water from infiltrating into the soil. So when there was a
surcharge caused by the mantle flowslide this area just buckled up. I find
this unconvincing. To my mind a mantle flowslide progressing down hill at a
speed would have generated so much momentum that this relatively narrow area
would not be able to withstand any surcharge to even heave. It would have
been just swept down slope in one piece with everything on it. This heaped
up ground material was caused more probably by the effect of a rotational
slide.
As for the scars described by Dr. Weeks at the rear of this High Wall in
Mitchell's photo P7A, I am more inclined to think that they were actually
the effects of a retrogressive slide that happened after the High Wall had
failed. It could not be an indication of the beginning of a mantle flowslide
that progressed downwards from here. By the time this picture was taken, the
High Wall had moved a substantial distance and when seen together with the
scars spotted by Dr. Weeks, then it could not be an indication of the
beginning of a mantle slide.
I shall now proceed to comment on the alternative theory of Dr. Weeks -
the existence of a perched water table. When Mr. Han (DW10), who supervised
the borehole test for Dames & Moore, exposed that water, as a drilling
fluid, was used for all the borehole test this theory of the Dr. Weeks
losses creditability. By Dr. Week's own admission, when water was used
instead of foam then the reading of the standpipes inserted soon after the
boreholes were made would not represent the true water level for the purpose
of determining a perch water table of the ground. The reason is this: Water
introduced into the ground takes a substantial period to infiltrate into the
ground to reach ground water table. So when water level readings are taken
soon after water is introduced into the standpipes high water level will be
recorded. This may give a false indication of a perched water table existing
above the ground water table.
For a perched water table to prevail it is insufficient to just have clay
or clayey material present; there must be lenses of these and they must be
fairly proximate to each other to prevent water from infiltrating into the
soil below. Though clayey materials are found in the
Highland Towers Site and Arab Malaysian Land there is no evidence to
fortify that they are extensive enough to indicate presence of lenses of
clay of close proximity to form a perched water table. Against these facts,
Dr. Weeks criticises the methodology carried by Dames & Moore in its
investigation. He is of the view that Dames & Moore should have used a
piezometer (an instrument to detect pore water pressure beneath ground) to
locate the slip surface and in the course of this could have detected a
perched water table. I feel that this criticism is somewhat unwarranted. If
the plaintiffs wish to influence this court on the presence of a perched
water table then they must prove it. It is not for the 5th defendant to
carry out such task for the plaintiffs. As far as the methodology is
concerned, like in any form of investigation, there is more than one
approach. In this instance case I do not find the investigators of the 5th
defendant had carried out their probe in a manner unacceptable in their
professional field.
This Court's Finding
With the aforesaid reasoning I find that the landslide that brought down
Block 1 of Highland Towers was a rotational
retrogressive slide emanating from the High Wall behind the 2nd tier car
park.
Though this wall was the first to fail but what caused it to fail?
Professor Simons attributes it to poor design and construction and
reiterated that this wall, with a very low factor of safety, would have
failed even without any water pressure acting against it. But this High Wall
stood for ten years without failing. Why did it not fail earlier if it was
so weak and fragile?
Professor Simons causally offers this excuse: that at "certain location
the soil strength is stronger than what we have assessed". But I note that
he did not dismiss water as one of the factors that caused this High Wall to
fail, though he down played it by insisting that it only played a
"comparatively small role".
But I find this not convincing against all theories and principles
advanced to explain slope failure. Firstly, failure of a wall as defined by
Professor Simons means "the ground (beneath it) has failed" even though "the
foundation or structure of the wall may not fail". In this case it must be
the former since this High Wall is still visible in the Mitchell pictures.
With this, we must examine the soil condition beneath this wall. We have
evidence that the suspected area of failure consisted of sandy soil. Such
soil material is very permeable and water will percolate into it very fast.
With ten days of continuous rainfall in the area before the failure of this
wall surely the ground on which it stood would be saturated with water when
the drainage system of the slope was either insufficient or inadequate to
accommodate water. When this happened the pore water pressure in the soil
increased to cause the soil to be less resistance to slide. This must have
played a very major role in causing the ground on which this High Wall stood
to fail. Besides, it is also established that when soil is saturated behind
any retaining wall it will create a thrust against the wall. This must have
been the effect on this High Wall. Thus I find that water must have been a
major factor in causing the collapse of the High Wall and the landslide that
followed. In fact Professor Simons, in his expert report (P38) has
repeatedly emphasised water as a factor which caused the collapse of Block
1. But as to why he reduced its significance and importance is not
explained, leaving room for speculation.
Where Did The Water Come From?
But where did the water come from? From evidence adduced, it came from
two sources. The first was rainfall. Though rainfall in the area for the
same measured period of time did not exceed the amount which fell the
previous years it rained continuously for ten days preceding the day of the
collapse of Block 1. This rainfall that fell, part of it was absorbed into
the ground and percolated into the soil. The other would be runoffs and
washed along the surface. With the internal drains on the Arab Malaysian
Land, the water would be directed down the slope in a controlled manner. But
these drains on the Arab Malaysian Land were neither sufficient nor
efficient or maintained to carry the load, as described by the drainage
experts - Mr. Hooi (PW3) and Mr. Douglas Yee (DW12). Substantial part was
earth drains and this permitted easy percolation of water into the soil to
saturate it. Some were blocked or with vegetation growing over them, as
witnessed by the photographs taken soon after the collapse of Block 1. Such
blockage must have caused severe overflow on the terraced slope as disclosed
by Mr. Lim (DW1), the maintenance man of the Highland
Towers from the experience of the Tropic's clearance of the hill
slope without removing and clearing the debris from the hill slope drains.
The second source was water from the East Stream. As described earlier,
water from this stream was directed into the pipe culvert. A witness, Mr.
Mike Rickard (PW4) who tracked up the slope of the Arab Malaysian Land soon
after the collapse of Block 1 found this pipe culvert in very poor
condition, damaged in many parts with water leaking therefrom. He captured
these images on photographs exhibited in encl. 98. Subsequently, when Mr.
Hooi and Mr. Douglas Yee visited the same site to carry out investigations
they too confirmed what Mr. Mike Rickard described.
Not only was water not flowing smoothly along the pipe culvert, the area
before the water of the East Stream entered this channel was also heavily
silted. Mr. Lim (DW1), testifies that when he went up to this spot just
after the Highland Towers tragedy he found the
mud pond and the inlet into the pipe culvert completely covered with silt.
Due to this, water from the East Stream over flowed onto the slope. This
view is reiterated by Mr. Rickard with his photographs.
Liability Of Each Defendant
I shall now begin to examine the accusations by the plaintiffs on each of
the defendants and determine whether they are liable.
1st Defendant
Beginning with the 1st defendant, who was the developer of the
Highland Towers, the plaintiffs accuse it of the
following: Firstly, for not employing reasonably fit, competent, skilled and
qualified persons to design, draw, sign and submit architectural and
engineering drawings and plans for the construction of
Highland Towers and the hill slope behind it. Secondly, failing to
ensure that the three apartment blocks of Highland
Towers and the drainage system and rubble retaining walls around it
were constructed in a workmanlike and safe manner by giving consideration to
the surrounding terrain, soil condition and drainage requirement. Thirdly,
of obtaining Certificate of Fitness (CF) to occupy the three apartment
blocks when the drainage system in the Highland Towers
Site and Arab Malaysian Land were incomplete.
The first accusation levied against the 1st defendant is much connected
and associated with the liability of the 2nd and 3rd defendants. For the
second and third allegations, these too require examination of the works and
deeds of the 2nd, and 3rd defendants. For this reason I shall defer my
analysis on the liability of this defendant until my finding is made at
least against the 2nd and 3rd defendants.
The 2nd Defendant
In 1974 the 1st defendant engaged the 2nd defendant, an architectural
draftsman, to draw and submit layout plans for the development of
Highland Towers and the bungalows lots on the
Arab Malaysian Land. For this development, I shall hereinafter refer to it
as the "Highland Towers Project". According to
the 2nd defendant, an executive director of the 1st defendant, one Mr. Yap,
was aware that he was not a fully qualified and registered architect. When
the layout plan for the Highland Towers Project
was approved, the 2nd defendant proceeded to prepare and submit building
plans for the three apartment blocks of Highland Towers.
The following chronology of events will give an insight of what
transpired in the course of building Highland Towers
and the development of the Arab Malaysian Land including the surrounding
area.
Chronology Of Events
On 9 October 1974 a layout plan submitted by the 2nd defendant, for and
on behalf of the 1st defendant, to the district office of Kuala Lumpur, the
predecessor of the 4th defendant, was approved. This approved layout plan is
for a proposed building of three blocks of apartments on
Highland Towers Site and bungalows on the Arab
Malaysian Land. Accompanying this approval was a letter by this district
office to say that the approval was subjected inter alia to the
following conditions:
1. because the area approved for development is steep and hilly, all
excavation and levelling works must follow requirements set out by the
Public Works Department; and
2. the relevant technical departments must approve drainage, road and
other related plans before any development can begin.
The 2nd defendant in submitting this layout plan and subsequent building
plans for the Highland Towers was only a
draftsman, but had held himself out as a registered architect. The
authorities, by some error on their part in not checking the 2nd defendant's
credentials, had in fact permitted him to submit such building proposals and
plans.
On 22 November 1975, the Lembaga Bandaran Gombak (LBG), the local
authority who had taken over the administrative function of the area from
the district office, informed the 2nd defendant that the drainage plan
submitted was not approved by the Irrigation and Drainage Department (JPS)
because no provision was made to cater for the stream in the area. It
proceeded to advise the 2nd defendant to stop construction work on the
Highland Towers until the drainage for the
stream is incorporated in the plan.
(System Of Operation Between The Local Authority And The State
Government Departments)
At this stage it is necessary to disclose the system of operation between
the local authority, such as the LBG and its successor, the Majlis Daerah
Gombak (MDG), with various government departments of the State of Selangor.
During the construction and completion of the three apartment blocks of
Highland Towers the local authority having
jurisdiction over the area was in its formative years. It lacked manpower
and facilities. To assist them, the State Government of Selangor allowed the
local authority to use its various technical departments to consider and
evaluate all matters relating to the development projects under its
jurisdiction. This included land levelling and drainage. In such matters,
the local authority acted merely as a secretariat. Upon receiving relevant
development proposals and plans it would send them to the respective
technical departments of the state. JPS, being a department involved, would
study the matter referred to it and after due consideration returned these
to the local authority with comments and suggestions. Such comments and
advice were normally accepted. These were then communicated to the
developer.
On 5 January 1976, in pursuant to a proposal by the 2nd defendant to
relocate some drains, JPS issued the following advice to the local authority
- LBG:
1. though the proposal of the 2nd defendant is acceptable but a drainage
proposal plan must be submitted by the consultant; and in the meantime no
physical construction work on the Highland Towers
should continue;
2. that the land being steep, care must be taken to construct silt traps
to prevent landslides or problems to the drains and stream.
On 13 February 1978, MDG who replaced LBG as the local authority of the
area, requested the 2nd defendant to construct an underpass drain to divert
water from the area proposed for drainage to the Klang River which was
across the main trunk road - Jalan Ulu Kelang and the cost should be borne
by the 1st defendant. This was met with displeasure from the 1st and 2nd
defendants as they felt other developers in the area should also contribute
to such cost.
On 19 August 1978 there was a request by the 2nd defendant to MDG to
issue a Certificate of Fitness (CF) for Block 1. Obviously construction on
the Highland Towers proceeded despite the
earlier order by the PLG not to do so.
On 29 September 1978 JPS suddenly informed MDG that its objection to the
2nd defendant's request for CF is withdrawn provided that no further
construction work should proceed on the Highland Towers.
One Dato' Goonting (DW17), the then director of JPS, explained that this
attitude was adopted because the authorities feared complaints from
purchasers of Block 1 who wished to move into the completed building.
Further JPS believed that the developer could still carry out the drainage
plan for the area after this CF was issued.
On 8 October 1978 JPS wrote to MDG to advise that no construction on the
other blocks of Highland Towers should proceed
since the land to be acquired by the 1st defendant for the drainage was not
implemented.
On 6 April 1979 the 2nd defendant submitted drainage plans to MDG. These
were rejected on grounds that they lack computation and detail and not of
engineering quality.
On 17 April 1981, MDG in response to the 1st defendant request for
issuance of CF for Block 2 required drainage plan to be approved by JPS
before consideration.
On 18 April 1979 JPS wrote to MDG stating that there were complaints from
residents in the vicinity of Highland Towers of
flooding. MDG was to instruct the 1st defendant to stop earth works and to
build silt traps as well as to submit drainage plans. In consequence of
this, the 1st defendant engaged the 3rd defendant as consulting engineer to
submit drainage plans. When the 3rd defendant came into the scene there were
proposals to acquire some land below Highland Towers
to channel water in the area to Klang River. This, however, did not
materialise.
On 18 September 1981 the 3rd defendant submitted a drainage plan to JPS.
This was partially approved.
On 2 October 1981 JPS withdrew its objection for the issuance of CF to
Block 2 provided the following conditions were met:
1) the 1st defendant was to put up a bank ganruntee for RM100,000 to
ensure that any drainage proposal when approved is carried out; and
2) that such drainage proposal, when approved, must be completed within a
period of four months.
On 6 November 1981, upon the 1st defendant securing the bank guarantee
which was placed with JPS, CF to Block 2 was issued by MDG. But no drainage
proposal was forwarded to JPS nor was there any approved drainage system
implemented within the period stipulated. Because of this, the bank
guarantee was extended.
On 5 June 1982, in pursuance to a request by the 1st defendant for a CF
to be issued to Block 3, JPS advised MDG to refrain from entertaining such
request until a drainage plan is approved and implemented.
On 6 May 1985 the 3rd defendant submitted a drainage plan (exh. P34).
This plan involves the construction of concrete drains all along the hill
slope of Arab Malaysian Land starting from the point where the East stream
enters lot 3671. Water from here will flow along these concrete channels
eastward down slope to join a set the drains along the road reserve at lot
3666. Following the road, the drains then proceed behind the three blocks of
Highland Towers in a northerly direction. Then
at the end of Block 3 they turn left until they reach Lot 3626. At this
point they will be connected to a larger drain situated on lot 445 which
belongs to the government. The point of entry into Lot 445 is marked on this
plan as "C".
On 24 October 1985, P34 was approved by MDG with the consent of JPS.
On the 2 December 1985 without the knowledge and presence of any official
from JPS, a technical assistant with MDG, one Mohd Harris (DW5) accompanied
only by a director of the 1st defendant went to the
Highland Towers Site and inspected a constructed concrete drainage
structure located at point "C" on P34. Such an inspection, according to Dato'
Gooting, was not the normal practice where usually a representative of JPS
would be present. Further, this inspection only focussed on a particular
section of an extensive approved drainage system. Thus this does not reflect
the drainage works approved in P34 has been complied with. After this
purported inspection, DW5 returned to MDG and wrote a report stating that
the drainage works were duly completed according to plan.
On 24 May 1985 based on the above inspection report, CF for Block 3 was
duly issued by MDG.
Plaintiffs' Claim & The 2nd Defendant's Defence
In the plaintiffs' statement of claim, the plaintiffs allege that this
defendant held himself out to be a suitably qualified, competent and skilled
person to design, prepare and sign architectural and other building plans
pertaining to the developments of Highland Towers
and the Arab Malaysian Land. In the performance of this task, the 2nd
defendant has breached a common law duty of care to the plaintiffs to take
reasonable care and diligence in ensuring that: the drainage requirement and
rubble walls in the Highland Towers Site and the
Arab Malaysian Land, and the earthworks thereon were adequately and properly
designed, supervised during its construction, and in compliance with the
requirements as set by the authorities. Further, by these same acts or
omissions, the 2nd defendant has created nuisance on the hill slope behind
Highland Towers.
The defendant's replies to the plaintiffs' allegations are as follows:
Firstly, he does not owe such duty of care to the plaintiffs. Secondly, even
if such duty of care exists, it is not breached. He explains that he was
only engaged to design the three apartment blocks of
Highland Towers and was never involved in the design, supervision and
construction of drains, rubble walls and earthworks within and outside of
Highland Towers Site. The 1st defendant, he
discloses, carried out these works; he played no part in them. Thirdly, he
blames intervening acts of the 4th, 5th, 7th, and 8th defendants in the
altering the condition of the area to cause the collapse of Block 1. This he
submits, breaks the chain of causation arising from his wrong doings (if
any), and exempts him from liability.
Analysis - Negligence
Preliminary Issue: 2nd Defendant Not A Qualified Architect
There was a considerable outcry over the qualifications of this defendant
in submitting and dealing with the development, building and other related
matters in the Highland Towers Project for
reason that this defendant was only a building draftsman and not a qualified
architect at the material time. As a building draftsman he was only
permitted under the Architects Act 1967 to design buildings of no more than
two stories in height and limited floor space. In this case, each apartment
block of Highland Towers consisted of 12 stories
with a built-up area far exceeding that allowed for a building draftsman to
undertake. This defendant seemed to have got round the authorities at that
the material time by inducing a relevant government department to grant him
a "specially authorized person" status under a repealed enactment (the
Architect Ordinance 1951). This he claims entitled him to summit and oversee
construction works of three apartment blocks.
To the plaintiffs, whether this defendant misrepresented himself as to
his qualification makes little difference to the duty of care he owes to the
plaintiffs. According to the plaintiffs' counsel, "if a man is unqualified
but holds himself out to be possessing a skill, he will be judged by the
standards of a reasonably competent qualified person" - see Jackson &
Power on Professional Negligence, 4th edn at 86 where the case of
Cardy v. Taylor [1994] 38 Con. LR 79, is cited in support.
I am in full agreement with this view. When this defendant had
represented himself as a qualified architect to all and sundry, as displayed
by his actions, then he must be judged according to the character he had
assumed.
Duty Of Care By The 2nd Defendant To The Plaintiffs
As an architect, his duty is primarily to his client because he has a
contractual relationship with him. But in law, an architect is also liable
to anyone who is sufficiently proximate and whom the architect could foresee
that his act and/or omission would cause damage to that person - see
Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edn, vol. 4(2) at para. 525. In this
case, the plaintiffs are the purchasers of the two apartment blocks
designed, supervised and built by the 2nd defendant. At the time when this
defendant exercised his duty as an architect for the
Highland Towers Project he must have foreseen that the apartments he
built would be sold, and purchasers, their servants and or agents would be
occupying them. Thus these purchasers would be closely and directly affected
by his acts and/or omissions and for this, he must have or ought to have
them in contemplation when he was directing his mind to his acts and/or
omissions. By this, I find a duty of care exist between the 2nd defendant
and the plaintiffs who are purchasers of these Highland
Towers apartments.
The 2nd defendant has insisted that he was engaged only to design and
supervise the construction of the three apartment blocks. He vehemently
denies that his scope of work extended to the drainage, earthworks and
construction of rubble walls on the Highland Towers
Site and the Arab Malaysian Land. And since there is nothing defective in
the design of the three apartment blocks that contributed to the collapse of
Block 1 then he should not be held liable. And if it relates to the
foundation of the Block 1, then the finger should not be pointed at him; it
is the responsibility of the 3rd defendant, the engineer. He declares that
he had not even been up the hill slope behind Highland
Towers before designing the buildings, let alone being aware of the
East Stream, which he only discovered while accompanying the judicial visit.
I think the 2nd defendant is under a serious misapprehension that an
architect is engaged just to design and supervise the construction of a
building and need not bother with the surrounding area where the building is
to be erected. Surely the primary consideration for the construction of any
building, or structure for that matter, besides the aesthetic aspect, is the
safety of the building. To achieve this, the condition of the land on which
the building is to be built as well as those in the vicinity must be
considered and evaluated, particularly if it has potential adverse effect to
the building planned. Like in this case, there was a steep hill right behind
the three blocks of apartments and a stream nearby. Both these elements may
affect the ground condition and drainage of the area on which the building
stood. These dangers were not unknown to this defendant, as he wishes this
court to believe. They were duly brought to his notice by the authorities
from the day the layout plan was approved.
Further, I find that his claim that his work was limited to only the
apartment blocks is false. When he submitted the layout plan for approval it
included the development of the Arab Malaysian Land. When the development
plan was approved this hill slope must naturally be part and parcel of an
overall scheme for which he must assume certain amount of responsibility.
Besides, he has taken an active role in corresponding with the authorities
and submitted drainage plans to them. All these are again evidenced in the
chronology of events and there is no necessity in singularising them out.
Though the terracing and the construction of the retaining walls on the hill
slope may be carried out by the 1st defendant but he, as architect for the
project, must ensure that such work be carried out in a competent
workmanlike manner so as not to affect the Highland
Towers which he was responsible. He must ensure that no soil from the
hill slope would come crashing down on his designs. With this, I cannot
accept this 2nd defendant's contention that his scope of work did not
include the hill slope and the drainage of the Highland
Towers Site and the Arab Malaysian Land nor that he had any knowledge
of these.
As an architect responsible for building the three apartment blocks, the
2nd defendant must have foreseen the plaintiffs, who were the purchasers of
the buildings, would be affected by his acts and/or omissions as stated
above. But Mr. Choo, his counsel, argues that though this might be so but
when there are intervening acts of 3rd parties which his client could not
have reasonably foreseen nor could have prevented, then his client should
not be made liable for any negligence to the plaintiffs. The intervening
acts, Mr. Choo claims, were the deliberate acts or omissions of other
defendants which caused and/or contributed to the plaintiffs' loss. To
support this he cited the case of Smith v. Littlewood Ltd [1987] 2
WLR 481. This is a case where some teenagers who were playing in a disused
cinema set it on fire. Not only was the cinema destroyed but also the
neighbouring properties. Those who suffered brought a claim against the
cinema owner. On appeal it was ruled that the defendant should not be held
liable because the defendant could not have foreseen such danger or
prevented the deliberate acts of the third party (the teenagers) in setting
fire to the premises which affected the neighbours.
I do not dispute the principle set out in Smith v. Littlewood Ltd.
But in our present case, the 2nd defendant did foresee the danger of not
exercising his professional skill, care and diligence in attending to the
initial and basic factors regarding drainage and the stability of the hill
slope. As an architect, or someone who represented himself as one, he must
have foreseen the dangers that if no proper, adequate and sufficient
drainage system and retention walls were built there would be danger to the
buildings erected below. Yet he neglected this basic duty. The intervening
acts of 3rd parties he may not be foreseen by him, but if a proper, adequate
and sufficient drainage system and retaining walls were implemented and
erected then the collapse of Block 1 may not even have occurred.
Was There A Breach Of Duty Of Care?
Having decided that the 2nd defendant owes a duty of care to the
plaintiffs, the next issue to determine is whether he has breached such duty
of care. In evaluating this, the standard of care to be applied is, as
expressed by Justice Windeyer in Voli v. Inglewood Shire Council
[1963] ALR 657 to be:
An architect undertaking any work in the way of his profession accepts
the ordinary liabilities of any man who follows a skilled calling. He is
bound to exercise due care, skill and diligence. He is not required to have
an extraordinary degree of skill or the highest professional attainments.
But he must bring to the task he undertakes the competence and skill that is
usual among architects practicing their profession. And he must use due
care. If he fails in these matters and the person who employed him thereby
suffers damage, he is liable to that person.
This liability can be said to arise either from the breach of his contract
or in tort.
From the facts as set out above it is obvious that the 2nd defendant has
breached his duty of care to the plaintiffs. He had failed in his duty as an
architect and had also refused to comply with the requirements imposed by
the authorities on the drainage of the area. Besides he had also colluded
with the 1st and 3rd defendants to obtain CF for the three apartment blocks
of the Highland Towers without fulfilling the
conditions as set out by the 4th defendants and/or its predecessors. The
compliance of these requirements and conditions were part of his duties as
an architect and failure to do so is a breach of his duty of care - see the
case of B.L. Holdings Ltd v. Robert J Wood & Partners [1978] 10 BLR
(though this case was reversed on appeal but not on this principle
enunciated). Further, though he was aware of the terracing on the hill slope
and the construction of the retaining walls which would effect the buildings
which he was in charge of constructing, he did not investigate as to whether
these were properly designed, adequately provided for and sufficient to
withstand any slope failure. His excuse of "how can I stop my boss from
doing anything" and "though I know I put great danger on everyone but (I)
have no choice (for I have) to earn a living" is not only inexcusable but,
as this case has displayed, 46 lives were loss as well as properties. On
this score, I cannot, but to reiterate my feelings towards such attitude as
expressed in my judgment in the case of Perunding Alam Bina Sdn. Bhd. v.
Errol Ho & Ors [1999] 2 CLJ 875 at 882 which is:
Though undoubtedly the ultimate decision of whether to proceed with, or
without approved amended plans lies with the proprietor, but when the law is
broken, the plaintiffs, as architects, to my mind, must report the matter to
the authorities. Otherwise they may not only be an accessory to the
commission of an offence but also liable to unprofessional conduct. If
everyone adopts the attitude that it is "the client's decision" and not the
architect's, and that in the general practice of the industry to built first
before approval, then there is practically no necessity to obtain approval
of plans for any building. And if the argument relates to only major changes
needs approval first, then where is the line to be drawn between what is
major and minor. Is the episode of Jaya Supermarket which built an
additional four office floors without prior approval a minor deviation since
only a fine was imposed? If this is the attitude of the industry to rely on
the precedent of Jaya Supermarket experience, then it will be practically
forcing the authorities to compromise; very similar to thumping the nose of
the authorities.
Surely, as citizens and professionals, the plaintiffs must ensure that the
law must be followed, even at the risk of being discharged by the client;
otherwise, the architectural profession will suffer irreparable damage if
allowed to continue with such mentality.
Pure Economic Loss
Mr. Choo (as well as other defendants) has raised the issue that this
claim of the plaintiffs cannot be maintained because it is a claim for "pure
economic loss"; the two apartment blocks being the defective product.
To understand this legal terminology of pure economic loss it is
necessary to return to the case of Donoghue v. Stevenson which
commands the basic principle of negligence. In this concept, where there is
a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or
omissions which can reasonably be foreseen to be likely to cause physical
injury to person or damage to his property other than the damaged property
itself. By this proposition, a person without contractual relationship can
claim from another, damages for injury suffered by him or damage to his
property, other than the defective product itself. Any claim for this
defective product, either in the manner of making good or replacement
thereto, is a claim for pure economic loss. The facts in the very case of
Donoghue v. Stevenson gives the best illustration. Here, the consumer of
a bottle of ginger beer that contained a dead snail was successful in her
claim against the manufacturer of the drink for negligence resulting in
injuries to her health and damage to her property (if any). But she could
not claim damages on the bottle of ginger beer either in the form of asking
the manufacturer to make good this defective product or for a replacement of
it. This is because such claim would be considered as a claim for pure
economical loss.
By analogy to the factual situation regarding the 2nd defendant, the
plaintiffs' claim against him is actually for pure economic loss. The
plaintiffs are asking compensation from this defendant to make good the
defective building or for a replacement thereof which he was engaged to
built.
Over the years, arising out of dissatisfaction over this principle of
pure economic loss, the common law practicing countries had a change of
approach and decided to eradicate this rule. But sadly, the English Courts
after having agreed to this change reverted back to the old concept that
pure economic loss cannot be claimed. This stimulated fierce debate
throughout the Commonwealth where common law is followed. Malaysia was no
exception. In the case of Dr. Abdul Hamid Rashid v. Jurusan Malaysian
Consultants [1997] 3 MLJ 546 I gave my views that claim for pure
economic loss in this country can be maintained against a defendant. The
reasons for supporting this are comprehensively documented in that reported
case and I do not think it wise to add to the growing pages in this
judgment.
On this contention of the 2nd defendant, as well as all those defendants
who relied on this defence of pure economic loss, suffice me to say that it
must fail on the same reasons expressed in the case of Dr. Abdul Hamid
Rashid v. Jurusan Malaysian Consultants (supra).
Based on the reasons aforesaid, I find the 2nd defendant negligent.
Analysis - Nuisance
The other cause of action against the 2nd defendant is nuisance. To
succeed, the plaintiffs must prove that this defendant was an unreasonable
user of the neighbouring land to that of the plaintiffs' property and that
he did foresee that his acts/or omissions would cause damage to the
plaintiffs. On the first factor, Mr. Navaratnam claims that this arose from
the 2nd defendant being one of the creators of the situation on the hill
slope behind Highland Towers that gives rise to
the nuisance which caused the collapse of Block 1 and forced the plaintiffs
to evacuate their apartments. To support this, he cited the text by Winfield
& Jolowicz on The Law of Tort at pp. 59 & 66.
There is substantial degree of over-lapping between nuisance and
negligence in this case. Thus there is no necessity to recount the facts and
analysis already stated for negligence which is equally applicable to
nuisance. Based on the facts and analysis expressed and elaborated when I
considered negligence, I find this first factor of the 2nd defendant being
an unreasonable user of the land proved. Also satisfied is the requirement
of foreseeability. For this, I find the plaintiffs' claim for nuisance
established against this defendant.
3rd Defendant
The Plaintiffs' Claim & The 3rd Defendant's Explanation
The plaintiffs claim that the 3rd defendant by his acts an/or omissions
in preparing, designing and supervising in the construction of
Highland Towers and the drainage system of the
Highland Towers Site and the Arab Malaysian Land
was negligent and had caused nuisance to them.
The 3rd defendant is, and at all material time was, a qualified civil
engineer. His brother, the 2nd defendant, appointed him to be the consulting
engineer for Highland Towers. Initially, his
scope of work was restricted to the structural aspect of the three apartment
blocks. But subsequently, when the 1st and 2nd defendants encountered
difficulties with JPS over drainage of the area, the 3rd defendant was
engaged by the 1st defendant to submit proposals to the authorities to
resolve the problem. This resulted in his drainage plan, exh. P34, being
approved by the authorities. Slightly later, he was also retained by the 1st
defendant to design and supervise the construction of two retaining walls on
the Highland Towers Site. Both were in front of
Block 2. Other than these, he disclaims responsibility for the remainder of
the retaining walls on the Arab Malaysian Land and
Highland Towers Site. The 1st defendant, he insists, constructed
these; he has nothing to do with it. Though admitting that he was aware of
these walls being built he was under the apprehension that they were
designed and supervised by qualified engineers engaged by the 1st defendant.
Analysis - Negligence
The principles or test applicable to determine whether this defendant is
liable for negligence is the same as those used in analysing the liability
of the 2nd defendant for this same cause of action. They are both considered
as persons possessing special skills - see the case of Greaves & Co
(Contractors) Ltd v. Baynham Meikle & Partners [1975] 1 WLR 1095, and
thus their conducts are judged according to the standard of a skill and
competence of person in their respective profession.
From the particulars listed in the statement of claim the plaintiffs
identify three areas of negligence caused by this defendant. The first is on
the foundation of Highland Towers, particularly
that of Block 1. As disclosed in evidence, used rail piles welded together
were accepted as foundation to support of the three apartment blocks. Both
Dr. Weeks and Professor Simons consider this type of piles as inferior to
concrete pile. But as this type of piles was accepted in the engineering and
building industry to support high-rise building at the material time in this
country no fault can be attributed to the 3rd defendant in approving its use
since he was only adhering to the accepted professional practice at the
time.
But what I find unacceptable is the lack of consideration paid by this
defendant to the hill and the slope directly behind the three apartment
blocks. Though the 3rd defendant seemed to have taken comfort on what he
claims was the hill of low gradient (10 to 20 degrees as perceived by him)
and being some distance away from the building, I am bemused as to how this
impression can be formed when the physical appearance of the place was
completely different. What I saw during this court's visit to the site and
from the photographs and plans of the area taken both before and after the
collapse of Block 1, was a steep hill exceedingly close to the three
apartment blocks. In fact the hill was so close that this defendant had to
design and erect the two retaining walls in front of Block 2 to keep it from
intruding into the buildings. In one of the photographs adduced by the 5th
defendant, it shows the hill being separated from Block 1 by a narrow ally
way. When you had a hill so close and acute then the 3rd defendant should
have reasonably foreseen, judging by professional standard as an engineer
responsible for the structure of Block 1, the danger of a landslide
producing a lateral load against the foundation of the building. For this,
he should have exercised care to either design and construct a foundation to
accommodate lateral load or ensure that the slope was reasonably stable.
Failure to do so is a breach of his duty of care he owes to the plaintiffs
since his duty was to ensure the safety of the buildings he designed and
built.
The same excuse as the 2nd defendant was offered to disclaim
responsibility as to why the slope was not attended to. This is: he (the 3rd
defendant) was not involved in the design or construction of the other
retaining walls on the hill slope; it was the 1st defendant who did it. But
this view is totally unacceptable since, and as I have stated, the paramount
duty of an engineer for the Highland Towers was
the safety of the buildings he was involved. This duty cannot be exempted by
a mere belief of the retaining walls and terracing of the slope were
designed, supervised and built by the 1st defendant, whose director was an
engineer himself, or another firm of consultant, and therefore presumed
safe. If this was the belief of the 3rd defendant, then it encumbered upon
him to inquire and to ascertain whether: firstly, this other consultant is a
qualified professional, and secondly, what he was doing would have any
effect on the safety of Highland Towers. To
support this view I shall quote a passage from the judgment of Bingham LJ in
the case of Eckersley v. Binnie & Partners [1988] 18 Con. LR 1:
205 a professional man should command the corpus of knowledge which forms
part of the professional equipment of the ordinary member of his profession.
He should not lag behind other ordinarily assiduous and intelligent members
of his profession in knowledge of the new advances, discoveries and
developments in his field. He should be alert to the hazards and the risk
inherent in any professional task he undertakes to the extent that other
ordinarily competent members of the profession would be alert. He must bring
to any professional task he undertakes no less expertise, skill, and care
than other ordinarily competent members would bring but need bring no more.
The standard is that of the reasonable average.
The law does not require of a professional man that he be a paragon
combining the qualities of polymath and prophet.
The second area of negligence is in regards to drainage. Though P34, the
drainage plan, was approved but it was not fully implemented by the 1st
defendant. The reasons offered by this defendant were: shortage of financial
resources of developer; the need to bring down the road level to fit the
drains; and prohibition on rock blasting in the area. On the last reason,
evidence has proved this to be false. The second reason is much associated
with the first, but to my mind, what ever the excuse may be it did not
entitle and warrant the 3rd defendant to issue a notice to the authorities
stating that the entire approve drainage proposal was implemented when,
according to my estimates, only 10% was completed. This was a gross
violation of his duty of care which, as a consultant engineer for the three
apartment blocks, he owes to the plaintiffs as purchasers of
Highland Towers particularly when this approved
drainage system was so fundamental to the safety of the building. I have
reiterated my strong sentiments against this type of attitude of
professionals whose only consideration is to guard and secure their own
interest rather than their duties and obligations to those closely affected
and the public on which so much faith and reliance are placed on them to
carry out their professional duties. I need not elaborate further except to
remind this defendant that he has to live out the rest of his life knowing
truly well that he had contributed to the tragedy of
Highland Towers.
Based on the above I find the 3rd defendant liable to the plaintiffs for
negligence.
Analysis - Nuisance
On the cause of action for nuisance, I also find this defendant liable to
the plaintiffs. The reasons are similar to that stated under this category
of liability for the 2nd defendant which is basically: he who did the first
wrong must answer for the damage resulting from it - see Winfield &
Jolowicz On Tort, 14th edn at 514.
Returning To The 1st Defendant
Now that the actions and/or omissions of the 2nd and 3rd defendants are
examined and determined I shall return to consider the liability of the 1st
defendant.
Analysis - Negligence
On the cause of action for negligence the plaintiffs announce that this
defendant owes a duty of care to them in four areas and the 1st defendant
has breached this duty of care.
The first concerns the appointment of competent consultants to carry out
the designs, construction and supervision of the architectural and
engineering works.
As admitted by the 2nd defendant, he was not a registered qualified
architect when he designed, drew and supervised the
Highland Towers Project. In fact this was his first job of such
magnitude on his own. As decided earlier, he was incompetent and lacking in
skill. He failed to consider the effects of the steep hill on the building
he was engaged to build. He adopted a narrow view in not considering all
other factors that an architect of experience for such type of structures
would have taken into account. Worse is his failure to comply with
regulations set by the local authority for the drainage of the area,
particularly when he knew or ought to have known that unless the drainage of
the area was implemented he should not have applied for CF for the three
blocks.
The acts and/or omissions of the 3rd defendant are no better. His failure
covers: designing of suitable foundation, care and concern of the hill and
slope, and the issuance of a notice to the authorities confirming the
drainage works was completed when only a fraction of it was done. These are
certainly traits of incompetence and lack of skill expected of a
professional engineer.
Against these accusations, the 1st defendant counsel, Mr. Rajah argues
that though these consultants may be incompetent and lacking in skill but
they were independent contractors responsible for their own acts. In such a
situation, the 1st defendant is not liable for the acts of its independent
contractors.
Undoubtedly as a general rule, it is a correct proposition that an
employer of independent contractor is not liable for the default or
negligence of such a contractor. But here the plaintiffs are focusing on the
appointment of such personalities, not after they were appointed. This means
that before their appointments there was a duty placed upon the 1st
defendants to vet through them to ensure that they are competent and possess
such skill for the task they are employed to undertake. This involved
inquiries and investigations into their credentials and qualifications as
can be seen in the Supreme Court case of Datuk Bandar Dewan Bandaraya v.
Ong Kok Peng & Anor [1993] 2 MLJ 234 at 239. Obviously these were not
done. In fact even more extreme happened. Despite being notified by the 2nd
defendant that he was not a qualified architect, the 1st defendant proceeded
to engage him and even allowed him to appoint the 3rd defendant as the
consultant engineer for the project. This is surely negligent on the part of
the 1st defendant.
The second area negligence relates to the terracing of the slope and
construction of retaining walls and drains on both the Arab Malaysian Land
and the Highland Towers Site. Both 2nd and 3rd
defendants have expressly declared that it was the 1st defendant who carried
out such works. There is no denial of this assertion by the 1st defendant.
When implementing such works, the 1st defendant must have reasonably
foreseen that such works if insufficient and ineffective would cause the
collapse of Block 1 and result in damages to the plaintiffs, who are his
neighbours under the principle of negligence. The retaining walls have
proved to be insufficient and inadequate, as disclosed by both Dr. Weeks and
Professor Simons. In respect of the drains, there are the testimonies of Mr.
Hooi and Mr. Douglas Yee - the hydrology and hydrogeology experts (whose
theories and opinions I shall be alluding in the later part of this
judgment) to announce that these were insufficient to effect proper and
adequate drainage of water run-offs on the slope and those originating from
the East Stream.
With such disclosures I must conclude that the 1st defendant has breached
its duty of care to the plaintiffs and must therefore be liable to the
plaintiffs for negligence in the erection and construction of these
retaining walls and drains.
The third area complained of involves diversion of the East Stream from
its natural path to the pipe culvert which ran horizontally across the hill
slope directly above the three blocks of apartments. According to Dr. Weeks
this is exceedingly dangerous, as water should be always, when possible,
flow away from residential areas. But who diverted this East Stream? There
is a conflict of claims. The plaintiffs of course blame the 1st defendant
for having done this. Though the 1st defendant never directly denies this,
but Mr. Rajah drew this court's attention to an aerial photograph taken in
1966 (contain in the MPAJ report - P47) of the
Highland Towers Site and Arab Malaysian Land.
It shows the East Stream was already diverted across the hill slope before
the 1st defendant became owner of the said properties. This implies that the
1st defendant could not have performed this diversion. But surprisingly the
aerial photographs taken in subsequent years - 1974 and 1975 do not pick up
this diversion; it had disappeared. Then subsequently in later pictures it
reappeared. It was certainly there not long before the collapse of Block 1
for Mr. Lim - DW1 was in charged of maintaining it before the bungalow lots
were sold to the 5th defendant.
To this mystery the plaintiffs counsel offers this cue. He announces that
this temporarily disappearance of the division was caused by the 1st
defendant when they terraced the hill slope in preparation for the bungalow
lots. After terracing the pipe culvert was incorporated as an integral part
of the retaining wall to support the slope. Thus this diversion reappeared
in the later pictures.
I find this proposition probable. Looking at the retaining wall and the
pipe culvert besides it, the pipe culvert is actually an integral part of
the wall. It is not constructed independently and it does not stand on its
own. It is a section of the wall. Since the 1st defendant built this wall it
must be inferred that the 1st defendant also built the pipe culvert. By
installing this pipe culvert, the 1st defendant must be considered to have
diverted the East Stream from its natural course. And as declared by Lord
Finlay LC in the well-known case of Greenock Corpn. v. Caledonian Rly.
Co., and Greenock Corpn. v. Glasgow & South Western Rly. Co
[1917] AC 556, which is quoted by Abdul Hamid FJ (as he then was) in the
Federal Court case of Seong Fatt Sawmills Sdn. Bhd. v. Dunlop Malaysia
Industries Sdn Bhd. [1984] 1 MLJ 286 at 291:
It is the duty of anyone who interferes with the course of the stream to see
that the work which he substitutes for the channel provided by nature are
adequate to carry off the water brought even by extraordinary rainfall, and
if damage results from the deficiency of the substitute which he has
provided for the natural channel he will be liable.
As this pipe culvert was insuf |